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Abstract
This research empirically tested the response of antivirus applications to binaries
that use virus-like evasion techniques. In order to achieve this, a number of binaries
are processed using a number of evasion methods and are then deployed against several
antivirus engines. The research also documents the process of setting up an environment
for testing antivirus engines, including building the evasion techniques used in the tests.
The results of the empirical tests illustrate that an attacker can evade multiple antivirus
engines without much effort using well-known evasion techniques. Furthermore, some
antivirus engines may respond to the occurrence of an evasion technique instead of the
presence of any malicious code. In practical terms, this shows that while antivirus
applications are useful for protecting against known threats, their effectiveness against
unknown or modified threats is limited.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Antivirus software has become one of the largest commercial industries in regards to
computer security with an estimated 50 antivirus products competing to protect the end
user. This boom has been born largely out of the virus arms race which began in the
late 1980s (Moore et al., 2009, Hsu et al., 2012, VirusTotal, 2014). During this period,
virus authors and antivirus companies fought aggressively: the malware authors fought
to gain as large an infection base as possible while the antivirus companies fought to
remove these viruses (once they were infected) or to prevent them from infecting the end
user’s system in the first place. In response malware authors actively started preempting
antivirus companies detecting their malware by using scanning services (Krebs, 2009).
While antivirus companies have become successful at cleaning infected systems, the shift
has moved toward prevention rather than cure (Moore et al., 2009). This change from
curing a system of its infection to preventing the infection in the first place stems from
the complexity involved with current malware. Even after successful removal it can’t
be guaranteed that the system is completely disinfected and there always remains the
possibility that the malware modified the system in a way the antivirus company was not
aware off.
The reasoning behind this (being that since the antivirus companies do not have access
to source code for a piece of malware) it cannot accurately say that it has cleaned an end
user’s system to the extent that the system is in the same clean state it was before the
attack. Furthermore, once a piece of malware is able to get access to an end user’s system,
it is not beyond their capability to disable an antivirus engine without alerting the end
user (Alsagoff, 2008). This, in turn, renders the antivirus product ineffective at protecting
against further future threats.
To get around the protection that the antivirus engines developed to protect end users,
1
malware authors changed the way the malware was packaged and distributed. In response
to the subsequent modifications by antivirus authors, a number of evasion techniques
were evolved until a new evasion technique was developed. The techniques employed by
malware authors during the early 1990s are still in use today and will be discussed in
further detail in section 2.5. While these techniques have remained fairly unchanged,
very little formal research has been completed in the area of antivirus evasion analysis.
The research presented in this work aims to test these techniques on modern systems and
evaluate their effectiveness against modern antivirus engines.
1.2 Research Question
The purpose of the research documented in this thesis is to investigate whether binaries
which exhibit known virus-like evasion techniques can prove to be effective against modern
antivirus engines using on-demand scanning techniques. Furthermore, the research attempts
to determine if the antivirus applications react to the presence of the evasion technique
instead of the malicious code embedded within. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are dedicated to
exploring the different methods of testing the evasion techniques. The effectiveness will
be evaluated on a per chapter basis and goals will be defined as to what is expected from
the technique being evaluated. Each chapter will also undertake to identify if the evasion
technique targeted or the malicious code is being detected by the antivirus engines.
1.2.1 Hypothesis
It is expected that the evasion techniques being tested as well as the binaries being
tested will exhibit certain signatures that antivirus engines have already recorded. These
signatures are what will be detected and once modified by an evasion technique will
allow the binary being tested to pass undetected by the antivirus engines. This will
be demonstrated by using known clean binaries and applying an evasion technique. It
is expected that once applied, the antivirus engines will detect the benign binary as
malicious. This would indicate that the antivirus engines are detecting the evasion
techniques based on static signatures instead of the actions performed by the evasion
technique.
1.3 Limitations
One of the limitations of performing research into older malware, and the techniques used
to evade antivirus engines, is the absence of academic research in this area. As such,
many of the sources are taken directly from the ‘Virus Exchange (VX) Scene’ and the
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work that was published by these groups (Herm1t, 2002). The VX Scene is the term
applied to various groups that participated in the art of writing malware. These groups
would share information between each other via Electronic Text Magazines called E-Zines
(Knight, 2005). It is from here, that a fair amount of information will be referenced, as
this is considered the source from which virus authors got their ideas and shared findings
and techniques on building the latest malware (Thompson, 2004). A further limitation is
not being able to test polymorphic and more advanced evasion techniques that are more
dynamic. It is hoped that further research performed in this area will be able to focus
in on this area as it has significant potential to advance the field of antivirus evasion.
The research will focus primarily on the encryption and packing techniques - as they are
the only non-dynamic and evolving techniques. The last mentioned limitation is that of
constrained resources (of both time and money) required to explore the area of building a
sophisticated, custom malware lab and the automation of this process for future research.
These constraints will be discussed in section 4. Further the tests will only be performed
on windows based malware and does cover testing mobile or linux based malware.
1.4 Conventions
URL Referencing: During the course of the document there are instances in which a
URL link needed to be included. Due to the length of certain URLs they will be included
in the appendix and cross referenced via the footnotes on the relevant page.
Text Highlighting: Throughout the rest of the document commands that needs to be
executed will be emphasized using italics and where required the output will be displayed
in bold text. Output that is greater than a single line of 80 characters will be put into
tabular form.
Hashes: Throughout the rest of the document binaries will often be listed by the output
of a hash function against the binary. This is performed as concrete means of referencing
a binary. If for example the binary is renamed while its contents remain the same, the
cryptographic hash will remain the same. The hashing function used against the binaries
in the rest of this document is the SHA256 function, which provides a sufficient level of
entropy that a collision will not occur when hashing two binaries. To save space in the
rest of the document the results from the hashing will be reduced from 64 characters
to 12 characters, this reduction will be indicated by ellipses. When performing these
reductions, care was taken to ensure that there are no duplicate hashes which could result
in confusion.
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1.4.1 Malware Classification
There are a number of terms that need to be explained in detail regarding the classification
of malware. In general this document will refer to trojans, viruses or worms when referring
to malware. These terms will be explained in further detail in section 2.2 under malware
classification.
1.5 Document Structure
The remainder of the document is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 covers the categories of evasion techniques that have been used in the past
as well as those that are still currently in use. The chapter will begin with a high level
overview of attributes that define each category. The rest of the chapter will further
detail the evasion techniques. Some details covered include when the technique was
first detected and if the evasion technique is an evolution of a previous technique, or
a new technique. The chapter deals with each of the scanning techniques, which will
usually relate directly to an evasion technique used by malware. This will allow us to
identify how the viruses evolved and how the techniques that were implemented drove
the countermeasures antivirus engines used for scanning. We will observe that certain
techniques will fall away and are replaced by newer methods.
Chapter 3 discusses the building of the laboratory that will be used to automate and
streamline the process of testing antivirus applications. This also covers how the binaries
will be submitted as well as how the results are stored.
Chapter 4 explains how the antivirus engines will be tested by using a Black Box
approach of submitting binaries which have a known state and then monitoring the results
returned by the antivirus applications.
Chapter 5 focuses on the testing of the packer evasion type and its effectiveness against
antivirus engines.
Chapter 6 covers the testing of the encryption evasion type and its effectiveness against
antivirus engines.
Chapter 7 combines the efforts from the two previous chapters to determine if combining
these evasion methods can result in a greater reduction of antivirus detection rates.
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Chapter 8 presents the results from the preceding three core chapters as well as a
proposal for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by introducing some common terms that will be used in the rest
of the document in section 2.2. After covering the basic terms used in the document,
the chapter covers defensive measures used by malware to protect themselves from being
analysed in section 2.4. The chapter then documents the evolution of the known evasion
techniques used by malware authors in subsections 2.6 - 2.10. This is followed up by
discussing the scanning countermeasures implemented by antivirus applications over time
in section 2.11. Once the work on antivirus scanning evolution has been presented, related
work will be introduced in section 2.12. Thereafter, the chapter will be brought to a close
with the conclusion and a brief overview of the work in the next chapter. The following
section begins by dealing with a number of terms which were introduced in chapter 1 and
will be explained in detail.
2.2 Malware Terms
The term malware (short for Malicious Software) covers a broad spectrum of malicious
applications that can be found on a user’s system (Lin, 2008). As such, the research will
focus on the evasion methods used by three specific types of malware, namely: viruses,
trojans, and worms. These are only a few of the terms that are used to classify malicious
binaries, but are the terms that relate to the current work set. Before getting into the
details for each of the terms, it is useful to define what is considered a malicious binary. A
malicious binary is generally defined as any binary application that can affect the end user
system in unintended manner without the user being aware (Kramer and Bradfield, 2010).
The ignorance of the user, as well as the transformation of the system, is an important
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distinction. System administration tools such as Netcat1, Nmap2 and PSExec3 exist to
manage and secure the systems they manage. Even though these tools but are not built
with a malicious intent, they are often used by attackers to compromise an end user’s
system (Little, 2005). McAfee (2005) describes these tools as being potentially unwanted
programs (PUP) by an antivirus engine to indicate they may cause harm to an end user’s
system.
2.2.1 Trojan
The trojan is a type of non-viral malicious application that takes its name from Greek
mythology (Gordon and Chess, 1998). According to the myth, the Greek Army cleverly
gained access to the trojan city, disguised as an innocuous wooden horse (Gordon and
Chess, 1999, Burgess, 2003). The key feature of a trojan horse application is that
superficially it claims to be a safe or benign application to an end user, but secretly
provides a number of malicious actions to the person or group controlling the trojan horse
application. A trojan is commonly used to deliver keyloggers or a remote administration
tool which would allow the person controlling the trojan to steal data or gain full control
over the end user’s system (Gordon and Chess, 1999). A trojan does not attempt to
spread on its own, instead it masquerades as a harmless application (Gordon and Chess,
1998). By analysing existing trojans, Zolkipli and Jantan (2010) were able to extract six
sub-classifications for trojans. These sub-classifications are:
• Packed trojan
• Dropper trojan
• Downloader trojan
• Clicker trojan
• Gamethief trojan
• Backdoors trojan
For the purpose of this research, the dropper trojan is relevant and will be extrapolated.
The term ”dropper malware” is often used as a synonym for trojans because there is very
little distinction between the two. The dropper classification refers to a trojan that exists
to deliver other malware in the form of keyloggers or system backdoors (Zolkipli and
1http://netcat.sourceforge.net/
2http://nmap.org/
3http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx
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Jantan, 2010). The dropper trojan is significant to the current research because it is often
used in a multistage form of attack (Funk and Garnaeva, 2013). This multi-stage attack
pattern allows the malware author to gain a foothold on the targeted system and then
escalate to full control (Funk and Garnaeva, 2013). Ramilli and Bishop (2010) say that
the multi-stage attack pattern also allows for the first stage of the attack to be hidden
from antivirus engines much more easily than the second stage attack owing to its smaller
payload.
The term “dropper”, as applied to malware, has recently increased in usage because
of the term being applied to the binary that is distributed in watering hole attacks (Funk
and Garnaeva, 2013). A watering hole attack is an attack in which a legitimate website
is compromised and then used to deliver malicious trojans to a target’s system (Doherty
and Gegeny, 2013). The binary that is dropped to the targets computer is very small and
meant to establish a foothold on the targets computer.
2.2.2 Virus
A virus is usually characterised by a small application that is designed to spread by
injecting malicious code into other binaries (Cohen, 1987). The resultant effect on the
end user’s system is meant to interfere with normal operations. Szo¨r (2005) explains
that viruses tend to affect binary applications and replicate by modifying other binaries.
This is in contrast to worms which replicate as a whole and target systems instead of
applications.
The main purpose of a virus is to replicate and cause as much damage as possible to the
end user’s system or spread a message that the author wished to distribute (Sanok, 2005).
Viruses are not as popular today as they were during the early 2000s and as such, not
encountered nearly as much, this is evident from analysing the malware threat reports
between 2001 and 2014 (Global Research Analysis Team, 2001, Garnaeva et al., 2014)
and observing the increase in trojans in the most popular malware threats sections, while
observing a decrease in viruses decreasing in rank in the most popular threats between
2001 and 2014. While viruses are not as popular as trojans, they did popularize many of
the evasion techniques that will be covered in chapter 2.
The lifetime or generation for a piece of malware varies depending on the malware
being discussed as well as the type of malware. In respect to simple viruses, the lifetime
for a virus refers to how long it was out in the wild and until it was cleaned out by antivirus
software (Kephart and White, 1991). The generation of a virus generally refers to the
version of virus. Each new version of the virus would be considered a new generation.
When covering the more advanced malware in the later sections on polymorphic and
metamorphic malware, the lifetime refers to how long a virus existed in a state in which
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a single signature could detect that instance of the virus. The generation still refers to
the versions of a virus, where a new version would relate to a new feature being added.
2.2.3 Worm
Weaver et al. (2003) describes a worm as a self-propagating program that attempts
to spread by exploiting vulnerabilities in a computer system (Anderson, 1972). This
ability to self-propagate is what makes a worm particularly dangerous. The danger that
self-propagation poses can also be construed as a weakness of this class of malicious
application. If the systems that the worm targets are patched such that the vulnerability
that the worm exploited no longer exists, the worm will be unable to spread (Staniford
et al., 2002). The countermeasure to stop worms spreading between systems is simply
patching a system as soon as a vulnerability is reported (Kienzle and Elder, 2003, Yu
et al., 2010). Rescorla (2003) demonstrates that even when companies are aware of critical
issues, there is usually a significant lag in the time it takes to patch these systems. This
lag time and inefficiency from companies is what worm authors depend on in order to
gain as large an infection base as possible.
2.3 Malware Defence
With the terms in section 2.2 defined, the following sections provide an explanation for
each of the techniques that malware authors have employed in the past to defend their
creations. The techniques are sequenced historically from oldest to most recent.
2.4 Code Armouring
Code Armouring is the process of obfuscating and/or altering code in order to prevent it
from being analysed. While armouring itself is not, by design, specifically used to evade
antivirus engines, it is used to prevent automated and static analysis of the code, which
will result in a prolonged lifetime for the malware (Sikorski and Honig, 2012, Quist and
Smith, 2007).
Before getting into the specifics about the techniques malware authors employed
to evade antivirus applications, it is worth noting that most malware authors will try
to harden their malware through the use of code armouring to prevent analysis. The
techniques used by malware authors to prevent analysis will differ from author to author,
though most will use a series of obfuscations and traps to prevent debugging and disassembly
(Quist and Smith, 2007). Listed below are areas identified for which code armouring tries
to provide protection (Szo¨r, 2005):
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• Anti-disassembly
• Anti-debugging
• Anti-emulation
• Anti-VirtualMachine
• Anti-goat
These areas will be briefly explored to provide a deeper understanding as to the
reasoning behind their usage by malware authors. The techniques are dealt with in
the same order that a malware analyst would typically use to analyse a piece of malware
(Harper et al., 2011). Step one: analysing the application in an oﬄine or dormant state.
Step two: moving to an online state, where the application is debugged. Step three,
the final phase: is usually to leave the application in a running state, in order to collect
information about application behaviour the first two steps may have missed.
2.4.1 Anti-disassembly
Anti-disassembly is the process of protecting an application from being disassembled to
determine the internal workings of the application as (Aycock et al., 2006). Sikorski
and Honig (2012) describe the process of anti-disassembly as being commonly achieved
through the use of two groups of techniques. The first group of techniques involves
code obfuscation through dynamic code. This attempts to hide the intent of the code
by dynamically changing the code as it runs. The code could involve incrementing the
data at a specific address by a known value and then jumping to this location after
it is modified. While being analyzed by a disassembler, the code that is modified will
simply look like junk instructions to the application as it has not yet been changed. This
method of obfuscation is what was used by early viruses that encrypted themselves, such
as the Cascade virus. The second group of techniques largely revolves around attacking
different disassemblers through code and data in the application. By causing the code
in the application to be deliberately misinterpreted, the malware author can cause the
disassembler to display an incorrect view of what the application is doing internally.
2.4.2 Anti-debugging
While anti-disassembly protects an application from static and oﬄine analysis, anti-debugging
is meant to protect an application while it is executing a task (Branco et al., 2012). The
techniques implemented are too numerous to detail here, but are described in great detail
by Branco et al. (2012, Section 3). In general, anti-debugging techniques revolve around
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attempting to set the application into a debug state prior to the analysts debugger being
attached. Since an application can only be debugged by one debugger at a time, this
generally prevents any run-time analysis from succeeding. The alternative approach is
to check via a number of a system calls which are dependent on the operating system to
determine if a debugger is attached to the current process and then exit if one is detected.
The exact details of how these techniques are implemented will vary between operating
systems and hardware implementations.
2.4.3 Anti-emulation
In conjunction with anti-debugging techniques, malware authors will often implement
anti-emulation techniques in their malware. This is to prevent a malware analyst from
gaining a deeper understanding of the malware when executed on an emulated system
(Konstantinou and Wolthusen, 2008). The use of emulation provides a malware analyst
with the ability to trace the inner workings while the application is running and to
substitute instructions if an instruction is not available for the hardware where the
malware is being analysed. Emulation is a key technique in preventing malware from
running successfully. By emulating the environment of the target system, the scanning
application can reasonably determine if the actions of the code are malicious. After second
generation (introduced later in section 2.11.2) scanners were introduced, emulation played
a significant role in the detection of malware. It is in response to this, that anti-emulation
played such a key point in evading antivirus applications. It should be noted that most
malware that implemented anti-emulation in their code, did so to remain undetected
by the process of not executing their malicious code. While this is important, is it not
a generic enough technique that can be applied to a compiled application and requires
access to the source code of the application.
2.4.4 Anti-Virtual Machine
The anti-vm (anti-virtual machine) defences for malware are very similar to those of the
anti-emulation defence and exist to prevent malware from being analyzed and tested as
explained (Szo¨r, 2005). With virtual machine technology becoming more common thanks
to free applications e.g. QEMU and Virtual Box, more analysts are able to test malware
in the context of a virtual machine. This presents a major and unwanted problem to
malware authors, as the environment is almost identical in every manner to a non-virtual
machine. The means employed to detect virtual machines are similar to those used to
detect debuggers (Dinaburg et al., 2008), in that they either check for a known variable or
attempt to access a restricted piece of hardware that would only be available in a virtual
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machine (Rin, 2013).
2.4.5 Anti-Goat
Anti-goat defences are currently non-existent since the countermeasure they attempted to
defend against is no longer used. When viruses were more common and file infection was a
common problem, antivirus companies would routinely create “sacrificial goat” type files
that would be purposefully infected (Szo¨r, 2005, Aycock, 2006). Once infected the goat file
could be used to trace the infection path of a virus as well as any other characteristics of
the virus. Anti-goat technology provides protection by detecting that it is being executed
against a goat file for analysis and changes its mode of execution to either a mode of
non-malicious code or attempts to attack the user’s system by corrupting files. A virus
called ”Nexiv Der”, was one of the first viruses to implement the anti-goat protection
mechanism (Szo¨r, 1996). The virus was fairly complex, exhibiting both polymorphic and
multi-partite (the ability to spread through multiple infection vectors) traits, but was not
particularly successful in spreading due to a number of internal bugs.
2.4.6 Code Armouring Summary
While Code Armouring is usually effective in slowing down an analyst from gaining a
deeper understanding of the malware, as soon as the analyst does bypass the defences and
a signature is generated, the malware will forever be detected by antivirus applications
(Brand, 2010, Sikorski and Honig, 2012). It can, as a result, be said that Code Armouring
does not provide an active means of evading antivirus applications, instead it provides a
passive means of defence which can provide it with more time to accomplish the task for
which it was created. The previous subsections also demonstrate that malware authors
are very aware of what methods analysts are employing against their malware and in
response, they are building countermeasures to make the analysts’ jobs harder. A number
of the techniques described above i.e. anti-disassembly and anti-debugging were not built
for malware alone, but were also used by commercial software development companies
to protect intellectual property, though as with malware authors, all this can do is slow
down the person trying to gain access to the intellectual property. The section to follow
will introduce the evolution of active defences as employed by malware.
2.5 Early Malware Defence
Early virus writers did not attempt to evade antivirus applications (Rad et al., 2012)
because the antivirus industry did not yes exist for the consumer market. Instead,
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specific applications were crafted to either inoculate or remove a virus on a case by case
basis. Since malware did not have a specific antivirus application to evade, most malware
authors attempted to hide their actions from system administrators and users that used
the systems which they attacked.
2.5.1 An Early Example
One of the first viruses that attempted to avoid detection by a user was the Brain Virus
(Hypponen, 2011, Parikka, 2007) which was first detected in 1986 (Hypponen, 2011).
The virus worked by first moving the boot sector to a different part of the disk and then
overwriting the boot sector with the virus. Instead of getting an error message when
trying to load the disk (because of a corrupt boot sector) the virus would intercept the
call and redirect any access to the new boot sector location (OECD, 2009). With this
in place, most users would not know they were infected until the virus showed its alert
message. This alert message was intended to let the user know they needed to contact
the authors for support. While this may seem odd, the Brain Virus was not originally
written as a virus but as an anti-piracy protection scheme that would track users that
used their software without purchasing it (Parikka, 2007).
2.5.2 Response
There was no direct response to the Brain Virus from the antivirus industry, as the number
of viruses in the wild during the late 1980’s did not require a generic method of removal.
Solomon (1993) provides a list of only 8 - 24 viruses that were circulating at the time. To
put this in perspective, this occurred approximately three years after the Brain Virus was
first encountered. The listing also demonstrates that the common method for disinfection
was to simply provide a simple technical walk through to the system administrator who
could then remove the offending application from their system. Although this may have
been the case between 1986 and 1987, by 1988 antivirus companies started forming and
released a number of products aimed at the removal of a number of known viruses.
2.5.3 Evolution
Even though the Brain Virus and others like it did not attempt to evade antivirus engines
they did begin the chain of malware evasion techniques (White et al., 1995, Parikka,
2007). The next technique in the chain came in the form of malware encryption. This
technique (which will be discussed in the next section) is the first documented technique
that actively tried to evade antivirus engines instead of just hiding itself from the user on
the machine.
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2.6 Encryptors
Before detailing the history and evolution of encryptors, there are a number of points that
need to be brought forward for this section as well as the work in the sections to follow.
Regarding the encryption referred to in this section, as well as the remaining sections, the
encryption being referred to is the encryption of the internals of a binary both at rest and
runtime (Nachenberg, 1997). It is not referring to the encryption of user data, which is a
malicious side effect of a number of malware applications (Young and Yung, 1996).
2.6.1 History
Following the Brain virus, encryption was the first major evasion technique that was
used. Encryption is the process of converting text into a form known as ciphertext which
cannot be understood except by the intended target of the message. The strength of an
encryption technique is largely dependent on the following combination: the size of the
key and the implementation being used as described by Filiol (2004). When dealing with
malware that has been coded to use encryption, malware authors started with a simple
XOR cipher encryption as described in the work by Young and Yung (1996). By using a
simple technique, the margin for error occurring when developing an encryption algorithm
was reduced. Large keys by comparison are easier to build and this in turn, increased
the difficulty of decryption through brute force. An example of this in current malware
is the Gauss malware (Goodin, 2014a,b). The Gauss malware currently has an encrypted
payload which malware analysts have not yet been able to decode. While the analysts
working on the malware have worked out the encryption scheme utilized, they have not
been able to force the key or even guess the key, simply because the key is so large and
unique . Even though the encrypted payload is not being used to evade antivirus engines,
it does prevent malware analysts from determining the final target of the malware.
2.6.2 An Early Example
This technique was first noticed in the wild around the year 1986, in the event of the
Cascade virus (Hypponen, 2014). The virus operated by encrypting the body of the virus
with an encryption scheme of the author’s choice. The Cascade virus implemented a very
simple means of encryption called an XOR cipher. The XOR cipher, also known as an
additive cipher, works by adding a cipher key to the plain text to produce ciphertext
(Tutte, 2000). To extract the plain text from the ciphertext, the key is subtracted from
the text, which results in the output of plain text again.
The XOR cipher does present a problem. If the key is small enough, a cryptanalyst
could use statistical analysis of the text to determine the plain text. To prevent this, the
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Cascade virus attempted to make the encryption stronger by using a dynamic key for the
encryption process. This dynamic key that was used is based on the length of the body
of code. This meant that the key used by the virus would change for each binary file
that it infected. Additionally, the Cascade virus was also one of the first of a few viruses
that implemented Code Armouring. The armouring of the code meant that the job of
the malware analyst tasked with analyzing the virus was made more challenging, which
in turn meant that the virus had an extended lifetime. The Cascade virus implemented
armouring by using the stack pointer which would change as the application ran as part
of its cipher key.
2.6.3 Response
Antivirus vendors were able to adapt fairly easily to the rise of encryption in malware.
They were able to counter the increase of encryptors by detecting the decryption routines
used by the malware. The early method of detecting decryption routines (that will be
covered in further detail later in section 2.11.2) is through the use of entropy detection
which is introduced as the second generation of antivirus detection methods (Davis, 2009).
This was not used widely by the antivirus engines of the time, but it has become more
prevalent in antivirus engines today since the current processing power available to modern
antivirus engines is significantly higher than the past. The entropy calculation can execute
substantially faster, making this method of detection notably more feasible. The negative
result of entropy detection is that it is prone to false positives if a binary is responsible
for a significant amount of dynamic changes to itself.
2.6.4 Evolution
Encryption is the first method that was built specifically to allow a malware to evade an
antivirus engine. The technique itself had a sort of internal evolution as malware authors
attempted to make their encryption routines even harder to detect and implemented more
complex encryption routines. Unfortunately, because encrypted malware always requires
decryption before it can execute its code, this decryption routine becomes a weakness as
it is a single point of failure (detection). Oligomophism which is the next technique in
the chain of evasion techniques will attempt to fix this problem and will be explained in
the next section.
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2.7 Oligomorphism
Oligomorphism, which is part of the encryptor family of evasion techniques, was a direct
result of antivirus applications being able to detect the decryption stubs used by viruses
at the time (Szo¨r, 2005). These decryption stubs would still allow the viruses to employ
encryption to hide the body of the virus but would generate different decryption stubs
each time it spread. These decryption stubs would employ different looping techniques
that, in turn, generated different byte code that looked different each time a new copy
was created. This meant that antivirus engines could not detect the decryptor stub with
the use of static signatures (Schiffman, 2010, Rad et al., 2012).
2.7.1 An Early Example
The first time oligomorphism was detected was in the Whale virus in the 1990s (Skulason,
1990b, Szo¨r, 2005, McAfee, 2014a). While the virus was an evolution of the usual
encryption/decryption technique, it still suffered from a flaw in its design. The fatal flaw
was simply the limited number of decryptors used by viruses that employed oligomorphism
(Szo¨r, 2005, Schiffman, 2010). This meant that with a sufficient number of runs, a malware
analyst could generate signatures for all the decryptors a virus author had implemented.
While this may seem like a simple enough solution and method for detection, viruses
like the Memorial virus had 96 different decryption stubs built into it, which meant 96
generated signatures needed to be generated as noted by Konstantinou and Wolthusen
(2008).
2.7.2 Response
The antivirus vendor industry did not need a specific method to manage the detection
of oligomophism evasion techniques as the signatures generated by the decryption stubs
were still static for most of the viruses. In the instances where there were multiple
decryption stubs, the antivirus companies iterated as many decryption stubs as possible,
and made a record of their signatures. With multiple signatures linked to a single piece
of malware, an antivirus engine could still, relatively reliably, detect any malware that
employed oligomophism to hide itself. In certain cases (i.e. Memorial virus) generating
multiple signatures is not a requirement when the signature created is a nearly exact
match. The same applies to creating a wild card signature, as both methods are simply
means of creating generic signatures for malware based on multiple points in a file. A
more detailed discussion on how these detection methods operate will follow in section
2.11.1.
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2.7.3 Evolution
The use of oligomophism was a step forward in terms of the evasion techniques employed
by malware authors and although the technique served its purpose as an intermediate
solution, it was slightly flawed. Its flaw lay in the limited number of possible stubs
it could generate without bloating the malware. Additionally, the decryption stubs that
were generated lacked a dynamic nature. In response to this problem polymorphic viruses
were built as described in the next section.
2.8 Polymorphism
Polymorphism builds upon and attempts to fix the challenges presented in the previous
section on Oligomorphism. Nachenberg (1996), Konstantinou and Wolthusen (2008)
describe polymorphic viruses as viruses that were able to drastically modify themselves
between each iteration. Later, polymorphic viruses that were detected included mutation
engines. These engines, when implemented correctly, allowed the virus to generate millions
of slightly different iterations of itself (Nachenberg, 1997).
2.8.1 Early Example
The first known record of a polymorphic virus was the V2PX virus which was written as a
research project by Mark Washburn (Rad et al., 2012, McAfee, 2014b). The purpose of his
work was to demonstrate to Antivirus vendors that they could no longer depend on static
signatures to detect viruses. The V2PX worked by inserting random calls to functions
that would not affect its code but would alter how the virus looked to an Antivirus engine
(Lammer, 1990). An example of a function that would not affect the execution of the
code is the NOP instruction. The NOP is a ”nooperation” instruction, it is so named
because on encountering a NOP instruction, the CPU does nothing and moves on to the
next instruction. This instruction provides a malware author with a versatile and simple
way to change the signature of a virus without affecting its internal working operations
(Akritidis et al., 2005).
The key to effective polymorphic viruses, as demonstrated by the V2PX virus, is to
sufficiently change the program so that it retains little to no similarity between iterations.
This was primarily achieved through the use of junk data which performed no function
(as mentioned previously) or it expanded single instructions into multi-line instructions
(Skulason, 1990a, Konstantinou and Wolthusen, 2008).
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2.8.2 Response
The skeleton detection method of detecting viruses which was created by Kaspersky. The
skeleton method will be elaborated upon in section 2.11.2. This method stripped out
supposedly junk data before scanning a virus. This would allow the antivirus engine to
scan the part of the virus that was actually executed.
2.8.3 Evolution
It should be noted that until that point in time, polymorphism had simply been used to
make the detection of the decryption stubs harder. This meant that for the most part,
the body of the virus that was encrypted would still remain the same. As soon as the
main body of the virus was decrypted, it was possible for an antivirus engine to detect the
virus through its decrypted signature. The only methods of altering themselves employed
by malware authors revolved around the insertion of junk instructions; fake loops; and
fake jump instruction calls. Each of these attempts caused the decryption stubs to either
grow or shrink depending on the current iteration that the malware had spawned. To
overcome this challenge, the malware authors needed to create a piece of malware that
was wholly dynamic in that that would change significantly in how it executed between
each time it infected a binary. This resulted in the release of metamorphic malware which
will be covered in the section to follow.
2.9 Metamorphism
As is the case with each new evasion technique, metamorphism is an evolution of the
idea of polymorphism. While polymorphism attempted to make the decryption stub
difficult to detect, metamorphism attempted to make the virus itself a harder task to
detect without the need to encrypt the virus itself (Konstantinou and Wolthusen, 2008).
Metamorphism has been described as a polymorphic body since the body of the virus
changes from generation to generation (You and Yim, 2010).
2.9.1 An Early Example
The first known attempt at using metamorphism as an antivirus evasion tactic came in
the form of the Regswap virus in 1998 by Vecna (Szo¨r, 2005). The virus implemented
metamorphism by dynamically and randomly changing the registers it used within its
body between each generation. This method of implementing metamorphism with dynamic
registers was only one of the ways in which virus authors implemented metamorphism.
Other methods included:
18
• Garbage Code Insertion: The method entailed inserting garbage code by a
metamorphic engine which would not change the functionality of a programme
but defeat pattern based scanning. This is the old technique used by polymorphic
viruses, while it was generally avoided there are still some early metamorphic viruses
that used it.
• Subroutine Reordering: The Win32/Ghost was one of the many viruses that
implemented this method for dynamic code generation (Szo¨r and Ferrie, 2001). This
method of metamorphism differs from the garbage code insertion in that the virus
code between each version is the same (Szo¨r and Ferrie, 2001). To make the virus
seem different between infections, it changed the order of the code in the binary
which resulted in a different signature for the virus. Branch tracing is used as the
method of detecting this type of virus. Since the code base is always the same,
the binary would always have the same branching paths which could be used as a
signature to identify the virus (Radhakrishnan, 2010).
• Instruction Replacement: This practice was implemented by a number of the
mutation engines. This usually involved changing long form calls of an instruction
into many smaller calls. The Win95/Bistro virus is one of the many viruses which
used this (Szo¨r, 2000).
• Code Integration: This process was only really implemented by the Zmist virus.
Szo¨r and Ferrie (2001) demonstrate that the Mistfall engine, which powered the
virus, was able to decompile a binary and insert its required code into the binary.
Once it had added the code it needed, the virus would rebuild the binary, so that
it functioned normally. This was not seen in any other metamorphic virus of the
time, and speaks to the advanced nature of the virus.
Aside from the Regswap virus that was discovered in the early stages of metamorphic
virus evolution, there are two other viruses that have to be mentioned due to the sheer
complexity of their code and advanced techniques implemented.
The Zmist (Z0mbie.Mistfall) virus, which was first introduced under the topic of Code
integration, was the first of the viruses that broke new ground in terms of the advanced
functionality implemented by a virus. The code integration which is the most significant
and advanced feature of this virus, set the virus apart from all other viruses at the time
by allowing it to integrate with a host binary without the need to change the original
entry point of the host binary (Ferrie and Szo¨r, 2001). The virus also implemented Code
Armouring techniques by hiding the running process and spawning a new copy of the host
application so that it would remain undetected. The virus had no other aim other than
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to spread as much as possible and it did so by simply searching for exe files and if, they
matched the infection parameters set by the virus, they would be infected.
The second virus that showed significant innovation in the metamorphic space was
the Win32/Simile virus (Szo¨r and Ferrie, 2002). In a similar method to Zmist, Simile did
not change the original entry point of the application it infected and it also implemented
significant Code Armouring techniques which prevented researchers from gaining a full
understanding of the virus. To further complicate the analysis, the virus is estimated
to have 14000 lines of code, of which a major portion was dedicated to its internal
mutation engine. Notable work has been done by Szo¨r and Ferrie (2002), Konstantinou
and Wolthusen (2008) on the Simile virus, describing how it implements its mutation
engine as well as how the virus manifests itself to the user.
2.9.2 The Rise of Virus Toolkits
While metamorphism remains an effective method for evading antivirus engines, the
biggest challenge facing its implementation was that it was relatively difficult to build. As
a result, virus authors who had advanced virus building skills would construct polymorphic
toolkits that would allow others to simply plug-in their virus code and have it circumvent
most antivirus engines with a higher level of accuracy (Pearce, 2003). One of the first
toolkits that started this practice of selling antivirus evasion software, was a toolkit called
the Mutation Engine (Pearce, 2003). After the release of the Mutation Engine, a few
more toolkits were released, the details of some of these engines are listed below:
• NuKE Encryption Device (NED) : NED4 was created by the author of the
Virus Creation Lab and released in October 1992 (Beroset, 1993, Fuhs, 1995).
• TridenT Polymorphic Engine (TPE): The first version of TPE5 was released
in December 1992, with four subsequent versions being released to fix a number of
bugs. Around the time of it release, viruses created with this specific engine were
almost undetectable (Fuhs, 1995).
• Dark Angel’s Multiple Encryptor (DAME): DAME6 was released in June 1993
as a response the NED engine which was released by the competing group known
as NuKE. The engine was published with fully commented source code instead of a
compiled format (Angel, 1993, Fuhs, 1995).
4http://vxheaven.org/vx.php?id=en02
5http://vxheaven.org/vx.php?id=et06
6http://vxheaven.org/lib/static/vdat/engine1.htm#DAME
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2.9.3 Response
The antivirus vendors had been slowly building up their defences against malicious software,
but were only able to detect malware that employed the metamorphic evasion techniques
based on the payload the malware carried (Szo¨r and Ferrie, 2002). The payloads themselves
were again only detected in cases where the payload was destructive in nature. If the
payload implemented an unknown exploit, it is very likely that it would evade all antivirus
engines entirely. In fact, authors preferred to get recognized for their elegant work instead
of being acknowledged for the malicious consequences that could result - as noted by the
author of the Simile virus (Petik, 2002).
2.9.4 Evolution
The metamorphic evasion technique itself did not have any further evolution in its own
right. This is because for the most part, analyses of various metamorphic techniques
have shown that, when implemented correctly, the malware will evade antivirus engines
entirely. The challenge lies with implementing a metaphoric shell in order to wrap a
generic piece of malware. It is extremely complex to write a metamorphic virus even
with the internal knowledge of how the virus should work. Extending this to a generic
piece of malware, where there is no foreknowledge, is entirely error prone, as the malware
may already have Code Armouring techniques in place to prevent modification, or be
encrypted in which case any modification would break the decryption process.
2.10 Packers
Packers were not originally built for use in malware, instead they were meant to compress
applications so that they could be transferred faster over the Internet (Harper et al., 2011).
The use of packers increased once malware authors discovered that packers could easily
allow their existing code to evade antivirus engines (Perdisci et al., 2008). It is important
to note that this would usually only work against antivirus engines that scanned for viruses
on access (O’Kane et al., 2011). Heuristic detection (which would come along at a later
time) and would allow antivirus engines to detect the viruses after being unpacked.
A packer is normally built in two parts, this is similar to the way encryptors operate.
The author of the malware creates a small packer binary which will pack a target binary
of their choice. Once the target binary is packed, the decryption stub is injected into
the final packed binary. This is similar to the way encryptors originally worked (Brulez,
2009). The entry point for the binary is then changed, so that the decryption stub is
run first so that the application can be extracted into its original form and then run as
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normal.
Packers still suffer from the same issues as the early encryptors did: the unpacking
stubs are easy to detect (O’Kane et al., 2011). Once an antivirus application detects a
packer stub, it usually flags an application as malicious regardless of the packed content.
In most cases this means that many legitimate applications are falsely flagged. In order
to prevent false flagging, certain antivirus vendors will take the extra step and run the
application through an emulator when a packer stub is detected. This will allow the
application to run and allow the antivirus to detect malicious behavior.
Oberheide et al. (2009) point out that packing is often more of a time hindrance
to analysts instead of a deterrent. It requires a time consuming manual analysis to
be performed against them before details about the malware can be extracted. The
similarities of packers employing similar techniques with slight modifications to them as
the authors find issues with the original technique is described by Guo et al. (2008) in
which they discuss the problem facing the security industry having to deal with packers.
The extent to which packers are effective was demonstrated by Oberheide et al. (2009)
with his service PolyPack (Oberheide et al., 2009): an increase of 4.83 times better evasion
was recorded when compared to the baseline binaries that were presented.
2.10.1 An Early Example
A brief listing of the early packers and when they were released can be seen in Table
2.1 (Brulez, 2009). Two of the packers seen in Table 2.1 UPX and PECompact, are
still available and actively maintained. Based on the estimated release dates, it can be
concluded that UPX and PECompact have been in circulation for approximately fifteen
years. This will be noted when they are used for testing the packing evasion techniques
in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, aside from the release dates for early packers there is little
recorded history of how the packers and encrypters in table 2.1 worked.
Table 2.1: Packer Early Release Listing
Packer Name Version Release Date
Stone PE Crypter 1.0 23 December 1997
PECRYPT32 1.01 22 January 1998
PELOCKnt 2.01 7 April 1998
Petite 1.0 22 May 1998
UPX 0.50 3 January 1999
PECompact v0.91 beta 31 July 1999
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2.10.2 Response
Guo et al. (2008) notes that, as packers evolved, antivirus engines started detecting
the packer signatures (where present) as malicious. As a consequence, many packed
executables appeared as malware. While there have been a number of novel approaches
proposed to rectify this problem of simply flagging the stub as malicious (see Guo et al.
(2008), Royal et al. (2006), Kang et al. (2007)), it has proven difficult to verify which
approaches are in use by antivirus companies since the process that triggers these methods
rely on runtime detection.
2.10.3 Evolution
Packers in themselves have not undergone any vast changes from what was originally
implemented. Most of the efforts have been focused around Code Armouring instead of
antivirus evasion. Roundy and Miller (2013) have provided a detailed explanation of the
methods implemented by packers.
2.11 Malware Detection Mechanisms
This section aims to present some of the methods employed by antivirus scanners to detect
malware. These mechanisms will be discussed in direct relation to their related evasion
techniques. According to Szo¨r (2005), the various detection mechanisms can primarily be
classified into two generations of scanners, namely first and second generation scanners.
2.11.1 First Generation Scanners
The first generation of scanners were developed and mainly used during the evolution of
virus writing during the early 1990s (Szo¨r, 2005, Bustamante et al., 2007). These methods
of detection were focused around different means of signature detection. Consequently,
while they were useful at the time when they were invented, they quickly fell away to
more efficient methods of detection. The list below is a reduced list of the known antivirus
methods of scanning and indicates the order in which they were introduced to antivirus
applications. The sequence is based on the work by Szo¨r (2005).
• String Scanning: String scanning is one of the oldest known methods of detection
(Kephart and Arnold, 1994, Szo¨r, 2005). It works by having an antivirus company
record a known unique string that would occur in a virus and then it distributes it as
part of their signature database (Thengade et al., 2014). The antivirus application
on the end users computer system subsequently scans all applications for this string
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pattern which would, in turn, indicate the presence of a malicious application. String
scanning is still used in modern antivirus applications but to a lesser extent as there
are better alternative methods available. This method of scanning is limited by the
fact that it can not detect new viruses which have not had their signature recorded
(Thengade et al., 2014). The string scanning method of detection also means that
dynamic viruses that are able to change their signature can bypass this means of
detection fairly easily (Thengade et al., 2014).
• Wildcards: The Wildcard scanning method is an improvement of the basic string
scanner (Szo¨r, 2005, Thengade et al., 2014). Where the string scanner looks for a
fixed string to match, the Wildcard scanner looks for string matches but allows for
variations in the signature. This primarily allows the antivirus engine to deal with
multiple variants of a virus creation group (Thengade et al., 2014). The types of
Wildcards vary from simple byte replacements to byte ranges and in the case of
some scanners, regular expressions. This method of scanning suffers from the same
limitations as the Simple String Scanning in that it is limited to detecting viruses
that matches the search pattern (Thengade et al., 2014).
• Bookmarks (Check Bytes): The Bookmark method of detection is more of a
modification to the two previous detection methods presented above. The changes
to the simple scanning and wildcard are implemented to make them more accurate
which in turn ensures that there are fewer false detections (Szo¨r, 2005). The
Bookmark method of detection records the location of the string signature as an
offset from the start of the virus. In this manner, when the antivirus engine needs to
look for a signature, it can jump to a specific location. Alternatively, the antivirus
application can compare the length from the start of the virus body to the signature
that was found in order to determine if a virus or a false positive was found (a false
positive would have a different bookmark length). By looking at specific locations
for a signature the antivirus application does not need to scan the entire application,
this in turn speeds up the scanning process (Rad et al., 2011).
• Top and Tail Scanning: Top and Tail scanning refers to the locations that an
antivirus engine would scan (Rad et al., 2011). Top refers to the header of a file
and is usually considered (at most) to be the first eight kilobytes of a file. The
tail conversely refers to the ending of a file, and is also generally limited to eight
kilobytes (Szo¨r, 2005). This type of scanning was implemented to increase the speed
at which the antivirus could perform since (as computers grew more powerful) the
biggest increase came from large file sizes as well as slow disks. By searching sixteen
kilobytes of data only versus two megabytes of data, an antivirus engine could cover
24
many more files in the same time frame it would take to scan a single file. It should
be noted that this method of scanning still requires the application to look for a
fixed string or Wildcard signatures in the blocks of the application it scanned (Szo¨r,
2005, Rad et al., 2011).
• Fixed Point and Entry Point Scanning: Fixed point and entry point scanning
represents the evolution of the techniques listed above. These two methods still
work on signature detection, but instead of scanning chunks of data and hoping
to find a signature, the fixed point scanning simply looks at exact points in an
application for a signature (Szo¨r, 2005, Rad et al., 2011). Entry point scanning
took this idea a bit further and parsed the binaries header and looked for the entry
point location (the entry point is the location of the code which bootstraps and
launches an application). Once this location was found it was scanned for known
virus signatures. It should be noted that these techniques worked because viruses
would often replace the entry point for an application to redirect the control of the
application (Xu et al., 2007).
• Generic Detection: Generic detections were mainly used for variants of a known
virus and generally consisted of multiple previous techniques with some code to tie
the techniques together (Szo¨r, 2005). For example: an antivirus company might use
entry point detection to get to the initial area where the virus is located and then
search for Wildcard data in the area around this entry point.
2.11.2 Second Generation Antivirus Scanners
The second generation of antivirus scanners is a general grouping applied to the detection
mechanisms that was implemented to deal with the rise of dynamic evasion techniques
(Chien and Szo¨r, 2002, Bustamante et al., 2007). The following list outlines the major
techniques which the second generation of scanners used.
• Smart Scanning: Smart scanning was the first of the techniques to be developed
as a response to malware authors distributing malware kits which would allow a
prospective malicious user to generate a custom virus based on the variables setup
and available to the malware kit (Szo¨r, 2005, Leder et al., 2009). The way in which
most malware generation kits worked was by changing the order of function calls
or generating random names and inserting junk data into the calls. In this manner,
every application would look different but at its core was the same. Smart scanning
worked by ignoring all the junk data and looking for signatures that matched bits of
code that was fundamental to the application. This technique was also significantly
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used to scan scripts that would have a malicious outcome. Even if the script added
spaces and new lines, the smart scanner would ignore these and look for the code
sections and then scan code.
• Skeleton Scanning: Skeleton scanning is a method of scanning invented by Eugene
Kaspersky (Szo¨r, 2005)and works in a similar method to smart scanning. It discards
non-essential code and whitespace. Instead of then looking for a signature in the
remaining code, the scanning application built a signature of how the code was
structured. This code structure was then compared to previous known structures.
This process of detection further enhanced the ability of the scanner to detect any
variants of viruses. By defining what was the fundamental to the virus in a signature,
the antivirus company could easily ignore any new code added to a variant.
• Nearly Exact Identification: Nearly exact identification is similar to generic
detection in that a malware analysts would define multiple signatures for a virus
that would allow for partial matches (Szo¨r, 2005). This method of scanning was
required, in the case of overwriting a virus, for antivirus applications to determine
if the application could successfully disinfect an application. Instead of relying on a
single Wildcard scan, the signatures would be comprised of a number of Wildcards
and static strings. An example of how this would be used is when a variant of a
virus is found. The signatures might match but because of an invalid checksum,
the application will not attempt to repair the software as it could cause further
problematic issues.
• Heuristic Analysis: Heuristic analysis relies on being able to monitor an application
and then make a decision if its malicious or not (Szo¨r, 2005, Gryaznov, 1999).
Unfortunately, Heuristic analysis is not reliably accurate and subsequently results
in a large number of false positives which does not benefit the end user (Gryaznov,
1999).
• Entropy Detection: Entropy detection is relies on calculating the entropy of an
application and making a decision based on the level of entropy found in the code.
This method is often used when checking for packers and encryptors since these
types of evasion techniques result in applications with a large amount of random
data that only becomes valid once the application is executed (Lyda and Hamrock,
2007). This large amount of random data results in a high entropy scores which is
why entropy detection was so useful against encryptors and packers (Shafiq et al.,
2009, Alme and Eardly, 2010, Saleh et al., 2014).
• Filtering: Filtering cannot be construed as a method of detection as a standalone
26
model, rather it is accepted as a modification to the way in which applications would
scan for a virus (Szo¨r, 2005). It worked by limiting the number of files that needed
to be scanned based on the type of application or data that could be infected by a
virus. As a result, if a virus affected the boot sector the antivirus application would
not need to scan all the users’ files to remove the virus and further limit where the
virus originated based on the type of applications the virus affected.
• X-Ray Scanning: X-Ray scanning is another modification of the usual methods of
scanning. X-Ray scanning attacks the encryption and packing systems implemented
by malware authors and then checks the decrypted or unpacked data for a known
signature (Alme and Eardly, 2010). It is known as the X-Ray technique because it
allows the antivirus application to look into the software for signatures that might
not otherwise be easily detectable.
• Code Emulation: Code Emulation is the last of the second generation scanning
techniques and is also possibly the most complex technique. The antivirus application
would emulate a number of instructions that the Central Processing Unit implemented,
and then start tracking these instructions (Alme and Eardly, 2010). By doing this,
the antivirus application would be able to determine if the application is malicious
or not based on the calls it was making as well as the areas of memory with which
it was interacting. This method of detection is very closely related to Heuristic
analysis, but looks at the application on a much lower level.
2.12 Related Work
The taxonomy of techniques that are used to evade antivirus engines primarily stem from
the seminal work by Szo¨r (2005). He goes into detail explaining how each of the techniques
originated and elaborates on their level of effectiveness. Previous work completed in the
area of testing antivirus engines showed that there was a lack of research in this area
(Christodorescu and Jha, 2004). Their research was initiated after the conclusions of
Gordon and Ford (1996) indicated that there is a lack of testing processes and means
of safe testing of viruses. Their research also demonstrates methods that are slightly
different to ours, in that the services used in this research were not available. As a
result, the antivirus scanning was performed by manually submitting the malware to
the antivirus engines and recording the results after wrapping them with a selection of
obfuscation techniques detailed in their paper.
Oberheide et al. (2007, 2008) were some of the earliest authors to explore the concept
of automating the process of antivirus scanning and decoupling it in such a manner that
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it can scale as needed. Similarly, Oberheide et al. (2009) demonstrated in their work on
PolyPack how to build a service which could automate the process of evading an antivirus
engine through the use of packing. Their research was built in response to Kang et al.
(2007) who demonstrated that it is possible to automate the process of unpacking malware
before being scanned. They also illustrated that unpacked code showed a significant
increase in detection by antivirus engines versus packed code. Further work was completed
by members of the BitDefender team regarding investigations they performed in respect
to moving antivirus engines into the cloud (Chiriac, 2009). The outcome of their work
showed that while it is efficient to perform parts of the scan in the cloud, issues around
privacy and bandwidth considerations do not make it entirely practical.
In an empirical study of six of the popular antivirus engines at the time, it was
determined that the antivirus engines were not able to effectively detect all forms of
malware (Sukwong et al., 2011). The study followed the path of previous studies such as
those performed by Royal et al. (2006), Kang et al. (2007), Oberheide et al. (2007). This
is a deviation from the method of testing used in this report when compared to the work
done by (Oberheide et al., 2009, Kang et al., 2007, Oberheide et al., 2007), in that a large
number of malicious binaries are not tested in a scatter shot approach. Rather, a carefully
selected number of binaries were selected for testing. The reasoning behind this was to
determine if a targeted binary could be modified in such a way that it would bypass
an antivirus engine, this is known as the observed detection technique (Borello et al.,
2010). The online method of submission and recording as used in chapter 4 was initially
proposed and then demonstrated by Bishop et al. (2011). This method of testing involves
submitting the binaries that are being tested to an online service and then recording the
results for later analysis. This approach differs from Sukwong et al. (2011)’s approach in
that an oﬄine lab does not need to be constructed to test each of the antivirus engines.
The testing and recording approach was also demonstrated by Haffejee and Irwin (2014)
in which the effectiveness of antivirus engines as security layer was evaluated. Further
testing using the online method of testing was performed by Swart (2012) in which two
antivirus evasion frameworks were tested. The results from the testing demonstrated
that a single antivirus could not catch all the evasion techniques, but it was possible
for a single custom evasion technique to evade the majority of antivirus engines. Brand
(2010) detailed how a number of code armoring techniques protected the binaries they
were attached to. This worked also detailed how to detect the armoring techniques and
where possible remove them.
Regardless of the approaches used (online and oﬄine scanning) when testing a system,
the testing of antivirus engines are generally classified by two approaches, known as
black-box and white-box testing (Adrion et al., 1982). White-box testing is considered
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when the internal operation of the system are available to the tester because metrics
can be extracted on how the system processes the input. Black-box testing, by contrast,
is considered when the internal operation of the system is not known to the tester. It
focuses on testing the system by comparing the inputs to the outputs of the system. When
considering the scatter shot method of submitting hundreds and thousands of binaries in
order to a test a system, it can be seen as a useful white-box testing approach: see, for
example, Royal et al. (2006) with their automated unpacking system. By submitting
as many malicious binaries through the system they could, they were able to gain a
deeper understanding about the input data as well as how their system reacted to this
input. This is in contrast to the approach used for testing later known as the black-box
testing approach. In black-box testing, the internal workings of the antivirus applications
are not known and all that is of consequence is the output generated by the antivirus
applications. In comparison to the work Oberheide et al. (2008), the research performed
here is not attempting to quantify the amount of malware that an antivirus engine detects
as malicious. Rather, it aims to determine whether the binaries which the antivirus
already detected as malicious can be made to appear safe.
2.13 Summary
This chapter covered the evasion techniques implemented by malware authors in their
malware over time as well as the detection mechanisms the antivirus industry implemented
in order to detect and remove offending malware. What has transpired is that the antivirus
engines are always a step behind, and simply playing catch up by implementing new
techniques for detecting malware once a new evasion technique is found through manual
analysis. Furthermore, the malware and antivirus evolution has constantly improved
the state of art for both sides as they attempt to outsmart and outdo each other. This
chapter also demonstrated why it is important that the antivirus industry has its products
constantly evaluated and touches on how it was previously tested. Chapter 3 will explain
how this research intends to expand the area of testing by demonstrating the constraints
with the existing models of testing. In conclusion, suggestions for updated methods of
testing antivirus products will be made in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Antivirus Testbed
3.1 Introduction
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the antivirus industry needs to continuously
evaluate and re-evaluate its products to ensure that it is on par with what is available
globally in terms of malware and malware evasion practices. This work also needs to
performed by, firstly a suitably technically advanced user and, secondly in a consistent
repeatable manner. This chapter aims to disclose the method of testing antivirus engines
on a large scale and in a consistent and repeatable manner, as suggested. The chapter to
follow will explain how the antivirus applications scanning methods are tested. The goal
of this chapter was to determine the most suitable methodology for performing the test
in the upcoming chapters. The method of testing needs to lend itself to automation, be
repeatable and perform for multiple applications simultaneously.
3.2 System Selection
The options that were considered were grouped into either online or oﬄine services. There
are currently no publicly available oﬄine systems that can be used to test antivirus engines
in an automated fashion. Previous work analysing metamorphic malware by Borello et al.
(2010) demonstrates that building oﬄine systems are effective but require resources to
maintain. Oberheide et al. (2008), provides a good point of departure for the purposes of
this study. Regrettably, there is no output from this work that can be used immediately.
This means that any custom testbed would need to be implemented from scratch. In
contrast, there are a number of systems that are available that can be used for the online
testing. Of these systems, Virustotal1 is the most public and most accessible system and is
the one that will be used for testing later in this chapter based on previous work completed
1http://www.virustotal.com
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using the service which has proved that it is effective as an online testing platform (Gashi
et al., 2009). The only other comparable service is MetaScan2, while the website provides
the same functionality as VirusTotal it is not nearly as well tested or used by the security
community due to it being a very new website (only established on 1 December 2012).
All other services that provide online scanning are targeted at specific analysis techniques
instead of scanning via an antivirus engine.
3.3 Testing Methodology: The Custom Testbed
Before beginning the tests with Virustotal, a custom testbed will be built to evaluate
its effectiveness and viability versus using an online system. The testbed will attempt
to perform two major functions. The first of these is to automate the scanning of the
malicious software. The second function under scrutiny is the ability for the testbed to
scale in size based on the sample count as well as the number of antivirus engines that
needs to be tested.
3.3.1 Setup
A virtual environment will be used when building the custom testbed. The requirements
for building this environment are listed below.
• Virtual Machine Environment: The virtual environment is required so that the
system is sufficiently isolated from the tester. This is important in order to prevent
infecting the host when testing with malicious binaries.
• Operating System: A Windows operating system is required to ensure that the
antivirus applications are able to install and execute correctly.
• Antivirus Application: A single antivirus application will need to be installed
per virtual machine instance. This is to prevent conflicts between different antivirus
engines. When testing an antivirus product for effectiveness and viability, two
attributes are being primarily tested between the different antivirus products. This
is the ease in of automation and the ability to detect malware in an oﬄine mode.
The ability to detect malware in an oﬄine mode is crucial as one of the main benefits
of oﬄine detection is that the tester can be sure that the results from scanning a file
are not submitted to antivirus companies for further analysis, as is often performed
by VirusTotal. The ability to automate the antivirus is just as important as the
2https://www.metascan-online.com/en
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need to scan multiple binaries with different evasion techniques applied will take
too long if done manually.
• Browser: The browser installation is optional per virtual machine. Virtual environments
such as VirtualBox, allow a user to transfer files between the host and a guest using
internal processes. If this process for transferring files to the guest is not used (or
not available in the selected Virtual Machine Environment) then a browser is the
next simplest way to transfer files into a virtual environment without the need to
install third party services such as a FTP server.
• Automation Language: The automation language can be any programming
language that is able to control the Windows environment. This is required since
many antivirus applications do not expose a programming interface or provide a
command line version of the application.
For the base virtual environment, Virtual Box was used for building the virtual
machines (VMs) as it is free and supports all the operating systems (OS’s) that can be
tested. The operating system that was selected was the Windows operating system which
was installed in Virtual Box using the default install options. The operating system was
then updated to ensure that all available patches were applied. Once this was completed, a
snapshot of the operating system was taken using the built in Snapshot feature in Virtual
Box. This allowed for rollbacks to a known good state after executing a potentially
malicious binary.
At the time of comparison the top three antivirus engines based on protection were
Avira, Bitdefender and F-Secure as listed on the AV Comparatives website3. Of these
three antivirus applications, Bitdefender4 was the simplest application to automate. Further
Bitdefender provides a free version of their application for personal use which was the
version that was used for testing. The free copy also provides a non crippled version of
the core scanning engine (which analyses the binaries) which is what is important in the
upcoming tests. Due to time constraints the remaining two applications were not setup
and automated, as such after the base system was setup, the latest version of Bitdefender
was downloaded from the official website and installed.
After the antivirus was installed, a full system scan was executed with the Bitdefender
to set the system in a known good state before the malicious binaries are submitted. This
was also required since Bitdefender requires a full scan before it allows for a selective scan
to be performed. The virtual machine also had its network connection set to ‘host only’
mode (‘host only’ mode allows connections only to the host virtual machine) during scans
3http://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/home-windows/windows-8/april-2014/
4http://www.bitdefender.com/
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to ensure that the local virus engine is performing the scans and not sending files to a
remote server for further analysis.
3.3.2 Core Application Installation
Next a number of supporting applications were installed. First a copy Python 2.7 was
installed, this helped with scripting a number of tasks later. Lastly a copy of Firefox
and Autoit were installed. The Firefox installation was optional, but it assisted in the
acquisition of a number of applications when a download was required.
3.3.3 Automating Scans
Owing to recent updates5, it was not possible to perform a command line scan using
Bitdefender. Consequently, the scan are automated internally within the Virtual Machine
using Autoit6. Autoit is a scripting language that allows a user to script control over the
Microsoft Windows graphical user interface. An example of scripting the user interface
would be finding a window by handle and then moving the mouse cursor to click on the
window that was found. The process for automating the scanning of files is outlined by
figure 3.1, this shows the high level process that will be applied to a binary when it needs
to be scanned.
Automation Details As indicated in figure 3.1, the file will be uploaded to the virtual
machine via a web transfer using a simple web application hosted in python. Once the
binary is transfered to the virtual machine the network interface may be disabled if host
only support is not provided by the virtual environment being used. A manual scan will
then be initiated which will begin by opening Windows Explorer at the location at which
the file was uploaded by right clicking the opened folder and selecting the scan option.
Once a scan is completed, the results will be collected from Bitdefender’s log location. The
logs contain the scan results which will be parsed from the XML7 markup language and
stored for later reference in a SQLite8 database. The Autoit script that will be executed
when a user wants to run a scan on the virtual machine, then automates the scanning by
launching the “Windows Explorer” application. The script then navigates to the folder
where the binary which needs to be scanned is located. At this point, the script right
clicks on the folder and then clicks on the “Scan this folder with Bitdefender ” button.
This initiates a manual scan with Bitdefender. Once the scan is completed a pop-up
5http://forum.bitdefender.com/index.php?showtopic=17457
6https://www.autoitscript.com/site/autoit/
7http://www.w3schools.com/xml/
8http://www.sqlite.org/
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Figure 3.1: Process by which binary will be scanned
notification will appear when the scan is completed. An update to the logs maintained
by Bitdefender will also be made. These results are then uploaded to a simple webservice
running on the host system as means to get the data back to the host system.
3.3.4 Resource Consideration
The following are some resources that need to be accounted for when planning to setup
a custom malware testing laboratory.
• Setup Time
• Execution Time
• CPU Power
• Disk Space
• Financial Costs
While most antivirus engines do provide trial versions of their applications, these
usually have time limitations which creates a further burden on the tester who now has to
complete the tests in the specified time or to build the testbed in such a way that resetting
the testbed back to the original install date is possible. Another consideration is that if
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the testbed is being built on a cloud provider to work around the cost of purchasing a
valid license key, then resources need to be allocated to pay for the hosting costs. If the
cloud hosting resource is not going to be used, then it should be considered that there is
a physical cost with acquiring hardware that is powerful enough to test multiple antivirus
engines in parallel. If existing hardware that is already in place is used, where speed is not
important to the tester, then it should be noted that the scan time will be significantly
expedited.
3.3.5 Custom Testbed Summary
In conclusion, while this method of testing the antivirus engines succeeds and reflects more
accurately what an end user would be using, unfortunately this process is slow, error prone
and resource intensive in comparison to using a dedicated testing service (which will be
covered in the next section). In terms of resource usage, there are a number of resource
considerations that needed to be accounted for when setting up a laboratory. Resources
that need to be factored into setting up a laboratory are listed in section 3.3.4. As a
result of the restrictions imposed by these resource requirements, the custom testbed
implementation will not be further explored.
3.4 Testing Methodology: VirusTotal
VirusTotal was selected as the online application that was used for testing for a number
of reasons (Gashi et al., 2009). The VirusTotal platform is free for public use, this is
an important facet as it means that any future researchers will have access to the same
tools with which to re-execute the tests. VirusTotal also provides access to an application
programming interface (API) by which custom tools can use to build around the platform.
This API is what will be used later in this chapter to perform the tests.
3.4.1 Base Tool Compilation
The tools that were built were simply built around the existing Virustotal API and were
based on the existing VirusTotal Python library9 located from the Virustotal Documentation10.
Based on the code provided by this library, a number of scripts were built to automate.
The names of the scripts that were created and their functions are listed below while the
code can be found in the appendix.
9https://github.com/Gawen/virustotal
10https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/public-api/
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Table 3.1: Custom Scripts Used For Testing
Script Name Function
scan.py Manages the file submission and results recording.
rescanner.py Initiates the process of rescanning a binary with
any updated AV engines, the binary does not need to be available locally.
reportparser.py Manages the parsing of reports that is generated
from the scan.py script for data export.
generatePivot.py Script used to generate the pivot graphs for the
summaries at the end of the packer and encryptor chapter.
3.4.2 Resource Consideration
Fewer resources need to be considered when working with online systems. The resources
to consider are Bandwidth Usage, API Limits and File Size Limitations. When using
an online system the researcher needs to ensure that they always have a stable Internet
connection. Issues including bandwidth and privacy were covered in the work by Chiriac
(2009). In conjunction with this, the researcher needs to be aware that, depending on the
number of binaries tested, a sufficient amount of bandwidth is available to upload these
binaries to the online system. Aside from bandwidth limits, the only other major resource
restriction is the API access limits imposed by the online system. In the case of VirusTotal,
they limit API requests to four per minute, this means that the scanning manager needs
to ensure that this limit is respected or scan requests will fail. Four requests a minute may
not seem like an obstacle, but since scans were usually completed in under five seconds
there is an implicit waiting period that needs to be considered when scanning more than
four binaries. While this is not an issue in most cases, most online systems have upload
limits for the file size and as a result very large files cannot be scanned. While it is not
a resource consideration, it should be noted that VirusTotal does not implement the full
antivirus engine for use when scanning binaries. Instead, only the on demand scanners are
implemented and used when scanning. This means that while certain desktop antivirus
engines will detect a binary as malicious after a period of execution due to the use of
heuristics. Consequently, VirusTotal will not be able to use this method of detection and
can account for differences in results between and online and desktop scan.
3.4.3 VirusTotal Summary
In conjunction with the scripts developed to automate the interaction with VirusTotal,
the efficiency to cost trade-off means that using VirusTotal allows for the research to be
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executed in a speedy and efficient manner. By using VirusTotal, the research can also
focus on setting up and testing the evasion techniques instead of trying to determine if
the antivirus testbed is working correctly.
3.5 Summary
This chapter dealt with different methodologies by which the antivirus applications could
be tested. It also demonstrated that, while it is possible to create a custom oﬄine testbed,
this method is not ideal for testing a large number of antivirus engines - unless the
tester has significant resources with respect to both time and money. In the end it was
determined that implementing the testing via an online service (where the samples are
submitted for scanning) was the most efficient and returned results that matched those
from the oﬄine test. Having covered how the antivirus applications can be controlled and
tested, the next chapter will explain how the antivirus detection engines will be tested in
a manner that has both a logical and measurable outcome.
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Chapter 4
Antivirus Test Process
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 demonstrated how the antivirus testbed would be constructed. This chapter
will introduce the processes that will be used to test the antivirus detection engines against
each of the evasion techniques. This process involves submitting binaries to an antivirus
engine and recording the results. Since the binaries that are submitted can be controlled,
there is an expectation of what the output should be. Based on these expectations it can
be determined if an antivirus engine is successful in detecting the binary as malicious or
if it fails by marking it as safe.
4.2 Goals
The goal of this chapter is to find suitable binaries that can be used to evaluate the
antivirus engines for the expected outcomes set out in the introduction. The suitability
of a binary is determined based on the test cases in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Expected Test Case Outcomes
Test Case Expected Outcome
Benign Should not be detected as malicious or trigger any warnings.
Potentially Unwanted Program Should be detected as malicious or trigger warnings.
Malicious Has to be detected as malicious.
4.3 Selection Process
There are currently three categories that are covered when selecting which binaries with
which to test, namely benign, potentially unwanted applications and lastly, malicious
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software.
4.3.1 Benign
The first category is the benign application. These are applications of which it is certain
that there is no malicious intent from the application. The application selected for testing
in this section is signed by Microsoft which substantiates the credibility of the application.
In later testing, for each of the evasion sections, a number of tests will require a benign
application that is known to be non-malicious. The application selected to perform this
task is the “cmd.exe” or command interpreter from Microsoft Windows 7. It was selected
because it has no other dependencies and is a compact application. While the calculator
application is often used as a test application, there are a number of dependencies which
will cause it not to execute when running on a remote system if it is not in the correct
folder (the Windows system32 folder where it is originally located). Table 4.2 shows that
on submission to VirusTotal for scanning, the application does indeed not get detected
as malicious by any antivirus application.
Table 4.2: Benign Baseline Scan
SHA256 17f746d82695. . .
File name cmd.exe
Detection ratio 0/55
As expected, when submitting the application to VirusTotal for scanning, the results
show a zero detection rate which is expected. When wrapping the binary with each of
the evasion techniques it is expected that the results should remain zero when submitted
for scans. If the detection results increase, it can be attributed to the antivirus detection
of the evasion technique instead of the base binary.
4.3.2 Eicar Tests
The European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research (EICAR), as the name states
is an organization that developed a signature that could be used to test if an antivirus
engine was working. The signature created can be saved to a file, known as the eicar test
file1. While the eicar file is useful to determine if an antivirus application is running, it is
not a reliable means of testing any kind of binary dependent evasion technique. This is
because the eicar file needs to have any padding when scanned by an antivirus application.
Furthermore, any binary modification technique (of which will be tested in this research)
1http://www.eicar.org/86-0-Intended-use.html
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depends on a valid Portable Executable binary2. Since the eicar file is just a string, it
cannot be packed, encrypted or modified in any manner. Subsequently, the eicar file will
not be used for any testing for the purpose of this research.
4.3.3 Potentially Unwanted Program
The potentially unwanted program (PUP) provides a middle ground for which to test
the antivirus applications. These applications have the potential to be malicious, but by
nature they were not designed with malicious intent as the end result. These applications
work well as a test case, since tests can determine if the antivirus application is looking
for a simple signature or it is performing more complex scans.
Before each of the evasion techniques can be tested and a baseline set, a sample
malware application needs to be crafted in order to demonstrate that the evasion techniques
being tested are indeed allowing the application to bypass the antivirus. For a PUP to
be considered for use in later tests it needs to meet the following criteria:
• It must have the ability to be detected by multiple antivirus vendors as malicious.
This is needed to ensure that the application is indeed detected and not simply an
anomaly.
• It must be safe for the person running the tests. In the instance of accidental
execution it must not provide an attacker with access to the PC of the person
running the tests. This is also useful for ensuring the simplicity of the tests as a
sandbox environment is not needed.
• It must must have source code available. This is required for certain evasion
techniques that work by dynamically changing parts of the application’s internal
working as part of the application.
Based on the above mentioned criteria, the initial application that passed the selection
process by matching all of these properties is the NetCat application. The next section
will provide an overview of the NetCat application and the rationale supporting the choice
for this research.
4.3.4 NetCat
NetCat is an inert application that is not malicious by design. Its core function is to
assist in performing various network related tasks. Owing to its ease of use and its small
size, NetCat was commonly used by malicious attackers to either bypass firewalls or setup
2The file format required for file execution on a modern Windows operating system
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reverse connections for the attacker to a system they controlled. Once NetCat became
a common vehicle in malicious attacks, the majority of antivirus applications started
marking the binary as a virus. Presently, its detection has largely declined. The scan
results in the next section documents the instance where a compiled NetCat binary for
Windows was scanned.
4.3.5 Netcat Details
Before compiling a custom version of NetCat on our system, it is worth scanning the
compiled binary version of NetCat that is distributed along with the source code. This is
the version most antivirus scanners are likely to encounter. The variant of NetCat to be
used for the base line testing can be acquired from Jon Cranton’s website3 and the zip file
can be confirmed with the SHA1 hash of “2d3026b4630789247abf07aa3986d7a697cf4cd”
for the complete zip file. Note that the unsafe binary which has remote execution enabled
will be tested, as this is more likely to be detected as malicious by an antivirus engine.
The option that makes this version unsafe is the “-e” option. This option is usually
what causes the application to be detected as malicious because it permits an arbitrary
application to be executed once a connection is made to NetCat.
4.3.6 Scanning the compiled binary
Simply extract the archive acquired in the previous paragraph in order to obtain a copy
of the compiled binary . Once extracted, a binary called “nc.exe” can be found in the
destination folder. Next: navigate to the VirusTotal website and upload the “nc.exe”
application. This can be accomplished by clicking the ‘Choose File’ button and then
selecting nc.exe in the folder that it was extracted to. Once the file is uploaded, the ‘Scan
It’ button can be clicked. By submitting the application to VirusTotal, the following
results were returned :
Table 4.3: Scan results for NetCat using precompiled binary
SHA256 7379c5f5989b. . .
File name nc.exe
Detection ratio 21 / 46
The results in table ?? are a summary of the information returned by VirusTotal.
Located on this summary page is a detailed list of all the antivirus engines that detected
NetCat as malicious. The application that was submitted can be confirmed with the
3http://joncraton.org/blog/netcat-for-windows
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SHA256 as provided in the virus total summary. This data can be used to validate that
the same compiled binary is being tested. When contemplating the results further, it can
be observed that 21 out of the 46 available antivirus engines detected the application as
malicious. With a detection rate of greater than zero, the NetCat compiled binary is able
to meet the first requirement for use as a sample malware application.
4.3.7 Complications with the compiled binary
Unfortunately, because the compiled binary scanned was compiled by a third party, it
is difficult to determine if the binary is indeed safe to run locally. It has to be taken
into consideration that the third party who compiled the application may have inserted
custom code to change its behavior. To overcome this obstacle, a local development
environment is set up to compile the application locally. The application requires both
the GCC compiler and Make build application to be installed and requires a custom
script to build the application as the default ‘Make File’ is out-dated. Along with the
custom build script, an explanation of how the source code can be compiled on Windows
can be found at4. Once a local build of NetCat is completed, a re-test of the binary is
executed to ensure that it is still detected by multiple antivirus vendors as malicious.
When submitting the custom build to VirusTotal, the results in table 4.4 are found.
Table 4.4: Netcat scan results with custom compiled binary
SHA256 087a3c776bde. . .
File name nc.exe
Detection ratio 1 / 45
The results shown in Table 4.4, are a summary of the information returned by VirusTotal.
Since only a single antivirus vendor detected the application as malicious it will not be
considered for further testing. It is also worth noting that the one antivirus vendor that
did detect the application as malicious was the McAfee-GW-Edition antivirus. Further
McAfee-GW-Edition did not detect the submitted application as NetCat, instead it
detected the submitted application as a generic suspicious file (“Heuristic.LooksLike-
.Win32.Suspicious.J!89”). Note that unlike with the compiled binary, the hash for this
version of NetCat will not match the hash that may be encountered while running this
test on a different computer. The reason for this is that the compiler generates a compiled
binary that is optimised for the current environment that it is being built on.
4http://www.rodneybeede.com/Compile_Netcat_on_Windows_using_MinGW.html
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4.3.8 Reasons for discontinuation of NetCat
While the initial examination of the NetCat binary showed that it was indeed suitable
for use in the tests, execution of each of the tests showed issues that caused NetCat
to become unsuitable for use. Unfortunately once the binary failed to trigger multiple
antivirus engines as malicious (while using the locally built version of the application) it
could not be used any longer as this was the first and most important criteria required
for further tests to complete.
The tests show us that in the case of NetCat, antivirus vendors are more likely to
flag compiled binaries provided by a third party as malicious, as this is what is most
likely to end up on the user’s computer. It was also shown that by simply re-compiling
an application locally or in a different development environment is enough to beat 99%
of antivirus vendors in the case of NetCat. This further points to the fact that in the
instance of NetCat, most antivirus vendors are simply relying on a hash signature based
on the compiled binary to detect the application and that as soon as this is changed the
application is no longer detected as malicious.
4.3.9 New Baseline Selection
With NetCat now no longer usable as a sample for the baseline scanning, a new sample
application needs to be selected. In an effort to find an application that can fit the
rules that were defined previously, an investigation was done to find current tools that
are actively used in the security industry that were often detected as malicious but still
provided source code so that modifications could be made to the resulting binary. This
resulted in the Metasploit payload generated binary being selected for use.
4.3.10 Metasploit binary
The Metasploit binary that will be used is the output that is generated from the Metasploit
payload command. This binary is used to deliver a payload provided by Metasploit to
a targeted computer. This is useful for the baseline scanning as it would also allow
us to check if an antivirus vendor is checking for a specific payload such as a reverse
connection back to a target computer or if they are flagging the binary regardless of the
payload. Furthermore, the Metasploit payload generator allows for template binaries to
be provided. This can be used to decrease the chance of detection at a later stage when
trying to evade the antivirus vendors. It will be interesting to see how antivirus vendors
react to the built-in countermeasures provided by the Metasploit payload command.
These counter measures are often used in real world testing and may be used to flag
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an application as malicious. If this is true, then it will be interesting to see if a malicious
application can evade antivirus applications by not using these counter measures.
4.3.11 Metasploit Plain details
While the Metasploit payload application does not provide a compiled application in the
same way as NetCat does, it does have a number of templates that it uses to generate
the payload binary. Since these are the closest applications to a third party compiled
application (they differ because the final version will contain a payload within it) the
initial scans will be performed with these templates. Note that the template that will
be used for the test is the “template x86 windows.exe” binary which can be found in
the exe templates folder. As seen in Table 4.5: the template binary is already detected
as malicious. Based on the results from the NetCat tests this is most likely because
of a known hash and further testing with a locally built version will confirm if this is
correct. While not as many antivirus engines detected the application as malicious- when
compared to the NetCat application, at least one antivirus vendor did detect the binary
as malicious. This means that at this stage the binary can be used for further tests.
Table 4.5: Metasploit Template Original Scan Results
SHA256 640fc87b5754. . .
File name ad21c93553af23ecec319c0ea5f11b755acc3342
Detection ratio 22 / 55
4.3.12 Metasploit OPCode details
The Metasploit OPCode tests refer to the raw low level exploit code that is embedded
within a binary. Taking this into consideration, after testing the plain Metasploit binary,
a copy of the Metasploit binary with custom exploit code embedded needs to be tested
as well. This binary with the exploit code is closer to what the antivirus engine would
encounter when a malicious attacker tries to deploy malicious code to an end users’ system.
From the results seen in Table 4.6, an increase in the detection rate is observed. Since
this binary is similar to the previous binary (with the only change being the inclusion of
the opcodes) it can be said that the increase in detection rates is due to the opcodes.
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Table 4.6: Scan Details For Metasploit OP Binary
SHA256 1874c340ba2e. . .
File name template x86 windows op.exe
Detection ratio 23 / 54
4.3.13 Metasploit custom build details
As previously noted with NetCat, the binary compiled by a third party will not be used
for our testing and as a result, compilation from source is needed to ensure that regardless
of where the binary is built, it is always detected as malicious. Firstly it is recommended
that the build be completed using MinGW5. It is noted that although Cygwin does provide
similar tools it is more error prone. For the specific instructions on how to install MinGW
refer to the section in which NetCat was built. The current version of the tests are
being run on a Window 7 machine with MinGW as described earlier. The next step in
the process is to download the template file from Github6 and save it to a file called
template.c on disk. There is no ‘Make File’ option to build the template as the original
author may have built the binary with a custom script. As a result, simply running the
following command “gcc template.c -o template gcc.exe”, will build the template binary.
Results for template scan can be found in the Table 4.7. While the basic compilation with
gcc does provide some favorable results, the number of antivirus engines that detected the
binary as malicious is low (2/47). This is most likely due to the fact that the application
does nothing at all except crash when it runs. Following that, some machine language
instructions will be added which will be used to launch the calculator application. This will
allow the application to at least run without crashing and possibly trigger more detection
routines. The opcode template compiles to the same binary as would be generated by the
msfpayload application when using the template x86 windows.exe binary. Notice that the
binaries will not be identical to the byte level as they are compiled on different computers.
The template file with the opcodes added can be found in template op.c. The code can be
compiled with the following command “gcc template op.c -o template x86 windows op.exe”.
Once the application is compiled, the binary can be submitted to VirusTotal again. This
will generate the results which can be found in Table 4.7.
5http://www.mingw.org/
6http://bit.ly/1uGTASj
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Table 4.7: Metasploit Template Custom Build Scan Results
SHA256 76de5d51b259. . .
File name template gcc.exe
Detection ratio 2 / 47
Table 4.8: Metasploit Custom Built Template Scan With Embedded Opcodes
SHA256 1874c340ba2e. . .
File name template gcc op.exe
Detection ratio 6 / 47
Reading the results seen in Table 4.8, slightly better detection rates (6/47) are observed.
This is better than the initial version of the scan. These slightly lower detection rates
work in the favor of future analysis. The future scans are with an evasion wrapper - but a
higher detection rate means that the Antivirus engines are detecting the wrapper instead
of the base application. The test application cannot be built with the Microsoft compiler
as this prevents any potential exploit code from running.
4.3.14 Malicious Binaries
There are a number of reasons why testing with a malicious binary captured from the wild
is not ideal. Binaries in the wild will not have their source code available for inspection.
This makes it hard to determine the exact evasions that the binary may implement or
what malicious code it may be executing. Furthemore, if the malicious binary manages
to escape from the test environment, this could affect the host system that the researcher
is using. With these downsides, the malicious binaries from the wild still provide a useful
test case in that they represent verified malicious binaries and causing them to evade an
antivirus application demonstrates the true effectiveness of an evasion technique.
4.3.15 Build Process : Sample Malware and Baseline analysis
This section will explain how to build each of the samples that will be tested against
the antivirus applications for the baseline analysis. A detailed explanation will also be
provided on how the sample malware was selected.
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4.4 Malicious Binary Selection
When selecting which malicious binaries to use for testing, the top 3 unique malware
samples were selected from the samples submitted to the ”nothink” honeypot service7.
The service records and provides a malware honeypot as well as the statistics around
the data collected. Unfortunately, this is the only service that has made its statistics
available to the public, and as a result it is not possible to verify if these statistics are
indeed accurate.
Since there are no original names for each of the malware samples, future work will
refer to the hashes where possible (as each Antivirus has a different name for the malware).
To makes this less prone to error for future work, only the SHA256 hashes are listed here
even though the original web page (referenced earlier) used a md5 hashes. While initially
it was hoped that the top five malware applications would provide enough variety for the
tests, the top five contained only the Conficker malware. Therefore, the three remaining
malware that have a very high detection rate were randomly selected. These malware
samples were collected via the virus share distribution system8.
Table 4.9: Malware selection choices
ID Sha256 Hash Common Name (Bit Defender)
1 83023e32bb12. . . Trojan.Win32.Zapchast
2 5b9508b92a63. . . Trojan.Zbot
3 742915067b83. . . Win32/Sality.dropper
In the tests that will be executed later, it is assumed that after packing, the binary
will simply work as expected. This assumption is fairly naive, but owing to the fact that
the tests are performed with live malicious binaries, it is not safe enough to execute the
applications after packing as it is not possible to determine exactly what the binaries are
doing in the background. While Virtual Machine software will be used while packing the
binaries in order to ensure there is at least some level of buffering between the host and the
binaries being packed, it is not impossible for the malware to bypass the Virtual Machine’s
protections and attack the host system. All these issues are really not worth considering
when many pieces of malware run entirely in the background and do not display any
interface to the user and as a matter of course do not present any user interface features
with which to make a comparison.
7http://www.nothink.org/honeypots.php
8http://tracker.virusshare.com:6969/
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4.4.1 Baseline scan for malicious binaries
Before scanning each of the known malicious binaries a baseline record is required. This
demonstrates the effectiveness of the evasions. The first piece of malware analyzed is a
generic trojan called Win32.Zapchast that has been in the wild since 2006. Owing to the
age of this malware it has a fairly high detection ratio.
Table 4.10: Base Zpchast Scan
SHA256 83023e32bb12. . .
File name VirusShare 7ed3caf5e5e9f276b72694b79ab17c90.sf.report
Generic Name Trojan.Win32.Zapchast
Detection ratio 48/55
The second malicious binary scanned is the generic payload used by the Zeus malware
to gain a foothold on a target’s computer. As expected this has a fairly high detection
ratio as well as it has been in circulation in the wild for a number of years.
Table 4.11: Base Zbot Scan
SHA256 5b9508b92a63. . .
File name VirusShare 9fc364ccffe540c627733222641259c9.sf.report
Generic Name Trojan.Zbot
Detection ratio 49/55
The next piece of malware analyzed is from the Sality family of malware. This malware
family has also been in existence for a very long time with original detections recorded as
early as 2003. As with the other pieces of malware, the detection rate on this malware is
relatively high.
Table 4.12: Base Sality Scan
SHA256 742915067b83. . .
File name VirusShare e5120818378bd9b3766d45be99f96b59.sf.report
Generic Name Win32/Sality.dropper
Detection ratio 45/55
Custom Malicious Application The previous applications were selected because they
had been previously detected as malicious and as such would trigger an alert from an
antivirus engine. It is important to build a custom application that performs what would
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be considered malicious actions. An example of this would be a keylogger application.
There are few instances where a keylogger application can be considered as non-malicious
and in these cases exceptions can be added to the antivirus engine to ignore the application.
In the event that a legitimate application needs to hook access to the keyboard, there is
rarely the need to write to file after a keyboard event is triggered. These two items - in
that sequence - exhibit the signature of a keylogger application. This section will cover
the building of a keylogger which should be detected as malicious by an antivirus engine.
While the end goal is for the application to trigger an antivirus alert, this may not be the
end result which would necessitate using a prepackaged keylogger which already triggers
and alert. The expected result from this test is not to be detected as malicious, but for
antivirus engines (which claim to use heuristic detection) to trigger an alert.
Application Details Since the testing is targeting the Windows platform, the keylogger
will be built using the C# programming language. It will make use of the Windows hooks
exposed by the Windows API. The application will also try to hide itself from the user
interface so that there is no way to exit the application aside from finding it and manually
killing the process.
Build Process When building a keylogger, the following process will be adhered to.
The first step of the application will hook the windows keyboard API. Hooking the
Windows API is achieved by calling the “SetWindowsHookEx” function with a callback
to a function that will execute the users code. In our application the callback chaining
was implemented to ensure that any subsequent applications will also receive notification
of a hooked event if they have setup a callback.
The actual callback in our application will only fire on a key-down keyboard event.
Once an event fires that it has the key-down event, the code will open a file stream to a
file called log.txt in the current folder and write the key-code to the file. Thereafter, the
file stream will be closed and the “CallNextHookEx” function will be called which will
continue the rest of the callback chain.
Once the callback hook is in place and our function is set up to receive the calls, the
application will finally call the “ShowWindow” function with the SW HIDE parameter.
This will hide the application from the user’s Windows interface and prevent a user from
exiting the application.
Scan results After scanning the application for the first time with VirusTotal, the
results are shown in Table 4.13. The results illustrate that none of the antivirus applications,
barring the Norman antivirus, detected the keylogger as malicious (detected as “Obfuscated.AI!genr”).
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This most likely means that by building a custom application an attacker could potentially
bypass an antivirus application without much hindrance.
Table 4.13: Keylogger Scan Results
SHA256 21f97a50f7ef. . .
File name KeyLogger.exe
Detection ratio 1 / 53
4.5 Testing Process Usage
Having analyzed the different binaries for use when testing the evasion techniques, the
following order will be employed when testing the evasion techniques in the Chapters 5,
6 and 7. While this is test order, there are cases when a packer or encryptor will refuse
to work with a selected binary and as such will not be used in the tests.
Table 4.14: Antivirus Binary Test Order
Test Order Binary Expected Outcome
1 CMD Benign Benign
2 Metasploit benign malicious/warnings
3 Metasploit opcode malicious/warnings
4 ZapChast malicious
5 Zeus malicious
6 Sality malicious
4.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrated how the detection engine of an antivirus application will be
tested. As this is a blackbox test, it is not possible to extract further details regarding the
techniques used by the antivirus engines and as such, the testing needs to be as generic
as possible. This caters for multiple antivirus engines. Having demonstrated how to
control the antivirus applications en mass and test their internal detection engines, the
next chapter will begin by testing the packer evasion technique.
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Chapter 5
Evasion: Packers
5.1 Introduction
Having demonstrated how to set up and test the antivirus applications and their internal
scanning engines, this chapter will begin with compiling these processes and performing
the first set of tests using the packer evasion technique. Once the tests are completed,
the results will be compiled and analysed at the end of the chapter.
5.2 Hypothesis
It is expected that the antivirus application tested will be looking for specific signatures
in the form of either a sequence of bytes or an application hash. For this reason, packing
the baseline application will change the baseline application’s signature. This should, in
turn, result in a lower detection rate. It is expected that detections that are made will
be due to the signatures of the packer applications and not the signature of the baseline
application. This detection of the packers’ stubs does not mean that packers are malicious
by nature, rather: the antivirus industry tends to mark tools that are used frequently by
malware authors as malicious even though they have legitimate uses.
5.2.1 Goals
The results obtained in testing demonstrate that an average reduction in the number of
detections of at least 10 percentage points can be gained against the antivirus engines
that detect the baseline tests as malicious. Further, detections recorded in the test results
belong to signatures generated by the packer and is not the signature of the baseline
application. This will be demonstrated by the use of a benign application which will
produce no malicious detections when submitted prior to packing. The benign application
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will then be detected as malicious after being packed and submitted for testing.
5.3 Tests
The testing will be performed in two phases. The first set of tests will examine existing
packers that exist in the wild and are publicly accessible. This will provide us with a
base from which our custom packer can be compared. The second phase, will be to test a
custom implementation of a packer tool - as discussed in the section 5.8. The creation of a
custom implementation will allow us to compare the results of using a packer that might
be already known to antivirus engines versus a completely new method. While testing
the existing packers that are already in the wild, we will only be testing the three of the
available packers mentioned by Roundy and Miller (2013). While it would be beneficial
to test all the packers, 7 of the 10 packers that they name, are not available publicly or
executable on a modern operating system in the way that they were originally built and
meant to be executed. The testing section will also be split into multiple sections, the
first section titled Existing Packer Tests will cover the scans with the existing packers.
The next section Custom Packer Tests, will cover the building, as well as testing, of the
custom tests.
5.4 Existing Packers Tests
The testing of the packers will begin with a number of known packers. These packers
will allow us to record and compare the results from the antivirus scans of the custom
malware that will be built and tested in the next section. By submitting the resultant
binaries from these packers for scanning, we will be able to determine if the antivirus
applications are detecting the packers signatures or if they are triggering detection based
on the malicious content within. The packers that will be tested are listed in Table 5.1.
These packers were selected as they are the only available packers that run on modern
operating systems. Furthermore, these are the only packers that can still be obtained for
testing purposes. Each of the packers will be tested with the tests listed in section 4.5.
The tests will be grouped per packer.
Table 5.1: Packers Tested
Packer Name Antivirus Version URL
UPX (v3.91) http://upx.sourceforge.net/
ASPack (v2.29) http://www.aspack.com/
PECompact (v3.02.2) https://bitsum.com/pecompact/
52
5.5 UPX Background
The first packer to be tested is the UPX (Ultimate Packer for Executables) packer. UPX
is a common packer that has been in the wild since the early 1990s (first released in 1998).
While the packer was not written with a malicious intent, it became a major player in the
malware community owing to its efficiency as well the extremely small code size required
to unpack a binary packed by the UPX packer.
5.5.1 Benign Test With UPX
To begin the testing for UPX, a baseline scan will be performed with the benign binary
as indicated in Chapter 4. After performing the scan, the results can be found in Table
6 and followed up with the detailed results shown in Table 6. These results show that
only two antivirus engines detected the binary as malicious. Further: they showed the
signatures indicating a trojan and not a signature related to UPX.
5.5.2 Metasploit Basic Scan Wrapped With UPX
The basic Metasploit template scan aims to test whether an antivirus application can
detect the Metasploit template that is wrapped with the packer - or failing that detection,
it can detect the application once it is executed. The UPX packed binary is generated
with maximum compression using the following command:
.\upx.exe -f ..\plain\template_x86_windows.exe \
-o ..\plain\template_x86_windows_upx.exe
As can be seen in Table 5.2, there is a decrease of 22 percentage points in the number
of detections for the baseline binary when using UPX for the initial packing test.
Table 5.2: Comparison Against Original Baseline Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Original Packed Percentage Point Decrease
22 / 55 10/55 22 pp
5.5.3 Metasploit Opcode Scan Wrapped With UPX
The opcode scan refers to executing the tests with a template binary that has machine
code embedded within to execute an application by executing the dynamic code stored
inside the template application. By executing the binary in this manner, we are technically
giving it heuristics that would make the binary seem more malicious.
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.\upx.exe -f ..\op\template_x86_windows.exe \
-o ..\op\template_x86_windows_upx.exe
Table 5.3: Comparison Against Original Baseline Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Original Packed Percentage Point Increase
29 / 55 37/55 15 pp
As can be seen in Table 5.3, there is an increase of 15 percentage points in the number
of detections for the baseline binary when using UPX for the initial packing test. A full
listing of the antivirus engines that detected the binary as malicious can be found in Table
1. The exact reason for this increase cannot be stated since as the antivirus companies do
not explain their scanning processes. While this holds true, it is known that between the
previous test and the current test, the only change was the inclusion of the opcodes which
launched a non-malicious application (the calculator application). It stands to reason,
therefore, that it is likely these opcodes are what the antivirus engines are detecting.
5.5.4 Malicious Binaries wrapped with UPX
The last set of tests for the UPX packer are the wrapping of the malicious binaries as
defined in section 4.5. These binaries were packed with the default UPX settings and then
submitted for scanning. A summary of the scan results can be found in Table 5.4. From
this data, we can extrapolate an average reduction in the number of detections of 39.5
percentage points, for the malicious binaries when packed with UPX. While this is indeed
useful when evading antivirus engines, it is by no means significant as more than half of
the original antivirus engines that were tested will still detect the binary as malicious.
Table 5.4: UPX comparison of Packed vs Original Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Binary Packed Original Percentage Point Decrease
Malicious Binary 1 29/55 48/55 35 pp
Malicious Binary 2 28/55 52/55 44 pp
Malicious Binary 3 N/A 52/55 N/A
Malicious Binary 3:
There are no scan results for the third malicious binary as UPX was not able to
pack the binary. The inability to pack a binary takes place when the binary implements
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some custom protections or is already compressed. When checking the binary for existing
compressions of protection schemes with Protection ID1 (Protection ID is a tool used to
detect protection schemes employed by a binary), none were found. While this does not
conclusively mean it is not already packed or using a known protection scheme, it instead
means that the binary has been modified in such a way that these protection schemes are
not easily identified.
Table 5.5: Common antivirus engines across all three malicious binaries
AntiVir Microsoft
Avast Norman
Comodo Qihoo-360
DrWeb Sophos
ESET-NOD32 Symantec
Fortinet TrendMicro
Ikarus TrendMicro-HouseCall
Kaspersky VBA32
Furthermore, as can be extracted from the data in the Table 5.5, only 16 of the 55
anti-virus engines were able to detect all three malicious binaries. This is a cause for
concern since all three of the binaries have been circulation for at least one year (the last
submission time stamp indicates 2012-11-27).
5.6 ASPack Background
ASPack is a commercial packer that gained use in the malware community due to its
effectiveness to compress 64 bit applications which a number of other packers had issues
packing. ASPack had roughly only 1.3% of the malware market with regards to packing
(Roundy and Miller, 2013). It is one of the few packers that are still publicly accessible
and executable on modern operating systems.
5.6.1 Benign Test With ASPack
To begin the testing for ASPack, a baseline scan will be performed with the benign binary
as indicated in Chapter 4. After performing the scan, the results can be found in Table 8
and followed up with the detailed results shown in Table 9. These results show that only
two antivirus engines detected the binary as malicious. Further they showed the signatures
1http://pid.gamecopyworld.com/
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indicating a joke application and a generic malicious application, and not any signature
related to ASPack. It should be noted that the antivirus engines that detected the binary
as malicious are not the same as those that detected the UPX binary as malicious.
5.6.2 ASPack Metasploit Basic Scan
Since the ASPack application is driven by a graphical user interface, we cannot record
the commands required to pack the binary similar to the way the UPX commands were
recorded. To pack the Metasploit binary, simply select the application from within the
ASPack application. This will immediately compress and make a backup of the file. Once
the application is packed and submitted to VirusTotal, we get the following results. These
results will be analysed further in section 5.9.1.
Table 5.6: ASPack Basic Scan
SHA256 6312d0dabe92. . .
File name template x86 windows.exe
Detection ratio 6 / 55
Table 5.7: ASPack Basic Scan
Antivirus Version Common Name
CMC 1.1.0.977 Hoax.Win32.BadJoke.ScreenFlicker!
Malwarebytes 1.75.0.1 Backdoor.Bot.gen
K7anti-virus 9.183.13139 Backdoor ( 04c5312d1 )
K7GW 9.183.13139 Backdoor ( 04c5312d1 )
AhnLab-V3 2014.08.24.00 Backdoor/Win32.Bifrose
Ikarus T3.1.7.5.0 Trojan.Win32.Swrort
Table 5.8: Comparison Against Original Baseline Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Original Packed Percentage Point Decrease
22 / 55 6/55 29 pp
As can be seen in Table 5.8, there is a decrease of 29 percentage points in the number
of detections from the baseline binary when using ASPack for the initial packing test. It
should be noted that this reduction in detection rates is most likely due to no exploitable
opcodes being embedded in the binary.
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5.6.3 ASPack Metasploit Opcode Scan
As with the previous test: we pack the Metasploit binary with the opcodes embedded
with ASPack and then submit the compressed application to VirusTotal. Once submitted
we get the following results. These results will be analysed further in section 5.9.1.
Table 5.9: ASPack Opcode Scan Summary
SHA256 f1b93dddad1c. . .
File name template x86 windows op.exe
Detection ratio 29 / 55
As can be seen in Table 5.11, there is a decrease of 35 percentage points in the number
of detections for the baseline binary when using ASPack. As observed with the UPX tests,
once the baseline binary is embedded with opcodes that are associated with an exploit the
detection rates do increase. While the detection rates did not increase significantly (four
more than the previous test), it still indicates that certain scanners are looking for specific
signatures which are represented via the opcodes for detection. The common antivirus
engines between the three malicious binaries can be found in table 5.10.
Table 5.10: ASPack AV Scan Results
Antivirus Version Common Name
CMC 1.1.0.977 Hoax.Win32.BadJoke.ScreenFlicker!O
Malwarebytes 1.75.0.1 Spyware.Passwords
TrendMicro-HouseCall 9.700.0.1001 PAK Generic.009
Kaspersky 12.0.0.1225 HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
NANO-anti-virus 0.28.2.61721 Trojan.Win32.Inject1.cugnjk
DrWeb 7.0.9.4080 Trojan.Inject1.33413
TrendMicro 9.740.0.1012 PAK Generic.009
Microsoft 1.10904 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A
Ikarus T3.1.7.5.0 Trojan.Win32.Swrort
AVG 14.0.0.4007 Crypt3.IJL
Table 5.11: Comparison Against Original Baseline Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Original Packed Percentage Point Decrease
29 / 55 10/55 35 pp
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5.6.4 ASPack Malicious Binary Scan
The results from packing the malicious binaries can be found in Table 2. When comparing
the results from packing the malicious binaries with ASPack to the original detection rates
from scanning the unpacked binaries, the following results are listed in Table 5.12. An
average decrease of 60 percentage points was observed in the number of detections between
the original and packed version for each of the three binaries.
Table 5.12: ASPack comparison of Packed vs Original Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Binary Packed Original Percentage Point Decrease
Malicious Binary 1 16/55 48/55 58 pp
Malicious Binary 2 18/55 52/55 62 pp
Malicious Binary 3 19/55 52/55 60 pp
Only five antivirus engines were able to detect all three of the packed binaries as
malicious; namely AntiVir, Avast, Comodo, ESET-NOD32 and Kaspersky.
5.7 PECompact Background
PECompact is also a commercial packer similar to that of ASPack. The packer is one of
the top five packers with regards to packers employed amongst the malware community
with an estimated market share of 2.6% at the time of the publication (Roundy and Miller,
2013). As with ASPack, the packer gained a large market share owing to its effectiveness
in both compression and application control flow protection.
5.7.1 Benign Test With PECompact
To begin the testing for PECompact, a baseline scan will be performed with the benign
binary as indicated in Chapter 4. After performing the scan the results can be found in
Table 10 and followed up with the detailed results shown in Table 11. These results show
that nine antivirus engines detected the binary as malicious. This was significantly more
than any of the previous packers. The antivirus listing showed that most of the antivirus
applications detected the binary as a generic malicious application or as a Trojan. Only
the antivirus Agnitum detected the binary with a PECompact signature.
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5.7.2 PECompact Metasploit Basic Scan
In the same manner as ASPack, there are no automated commands to pack an application
and packing is handled via a graphical user interface. PECompact supports a number
of compression and protection schemes for protecting an application. All tests will be
performed with the default settings which uses a medium level of compression and no
anti-reversing schemes. After packing the application and submitting it to VirusTotal,
the results found in Table 5.13 (below), will be analysed in section 5.9.1
Table 5.13: PECompact Basic Scan Summary
SHA256 1f83dce7884b. . .
File name template x86 windows.exe - PECompact.exe
Detection ratio 11 / 55
Baseline Detection ratio 22 / 55
A decrease of 20 percentage points was observed in the number of detections when
compared to the baseline binary. The only observation that could be extracted from the
current test was that PEcompact has a low detection rate for the stub that it uses for
extraction. Unfortunately, this specific stub cannot be easily extracted and scanned alone
in order to determine if this is the case.
Table 5.14: PECompact basic scan results
Antivirus Engine Version Detected As
Bkav 1.3.0.4959 HW32.CDB.D7c0
Malwarebytes 1.75.0.1 Backdoor.Bot.gen
Agnitum 5.5.1.3 Packed/PECompact
F-Prot 4.7.1.166 W32/Threat-HLLIP.gen!Eldorado
Symantec 20141.1.0.330 Suspicious.Emit
TrendMicro-HouseCall 9.700.0.1001 PAK Generic.001
TrendMicro 9.740.0.1012 PAK Generic.001
AhnLab-V3 2014.08.25.00 Dropper/Win32.OnlineGameHack
Commtouch 5.4.1.7 W32/Threat-HLLIP-based!Maximus
Ikarus T3.1.7.5.0 Virus.Win32.Heur
Qihoo-360 1.0.0.1015 Malware.QVM17.Gen
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5.7.3 PECompact Metasploit Opcode Scan
The last of the existing packer tests that will be performed is the opcode binary packed
with PECompact. The same settings as those used in the previous basic Metasploit scan
will be used. The results from this scan be will be analysed in section 5.9.1.
Table 5.15: PECompact Opcode Scan Summary
SHA256 4d968080fb3a. . .
File name template x86 windows op.exe - PECompact.exe
Detection ratio 15 / 55
Baseline Detection ratio 22 / 55
As with the previous test, the scan results are significantly lower to any of the other
packers with a decrease of 15 percentage points was observed when compared to the
baseline binaries scan. While there is a decrease when compared to the baseline binary,
there is an increase in the number of detections of 5 percentage points when compared
to the previous test. As with the previous test, this is most likely due to the inclusion of
the OP codes which is the only differentiator from the previous test.
Table 5.16: PECompact Opcode Scan Antivirus Results
Antivirus Engine Version Detected As
CMC 1.1.0.977 P2P-Worm.Win32.SpyBot!O
Agnitum 5.5.1.3 Packed/PECompact
TrendMicro-HouseCall 9.700.0.1001 PAK Generic.001
Kaspersky 12.0.0.1225 HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
NANO-antivirus 0.28.2.61721 Trojan.Win32.Inject1.cugnjk
Rising 25.0.0.11 PE:HackTool.Swrort!1.6477
DrWeb 7.0.9.4080 Trojan.Inject1.33413
TrendMicro 9.740.0.1012 PAK Generic.001
Microsoft 1.10904 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A
Ikarus T3.1.7.5.0 Trojan.Win32.Swrort
AVG 14.0.0.4007 Crypt3.IJL
5.7.4 PECompact Malicious Binary Scan
The base results from packing the malicious binaries with PEComact can be found in Table
3. When comparing the results from packing the malicious binaries with PECompact to
the original detection rates from scanning the unpacked binaries, the following results are
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listed in Table 5.12 are found. An average decrease of 59 percentage points was observed
in the number of detections across the three malicious binaries when compared to their
baseline scans.
Table 5.17: PECompact comparison of Packed vs Original Detection Rates
Detection Rate
Binary Packed Original Percentage Point Decrease
Malicious Binary 1 18/55 48/55 55 pp
Malicious Binary 2 18/55 52/55 62 pp
Malicious Binary 3 19/55 52/55 60 pp
While not listed above comprehensively, it can be found that only six antivirus engines
were able to detect all three of the packed binaries as malicious. These antivirus engines
are listed in Table 5.18.
Table 5.18: Common antivirus engines between Malicious binary 1,2,3 with PEcompact
Agnitum
AntiVir
Avast
ESET-NOD32
TrendMicro
TrendMicro-HouseCall
5.8 Custom Packers Tests
The building of a packer is not clearly defined in previously conducted research and
therefore the following method for building a packer is acquired from the analysis of
existing malware. When analysed, the following methodology was revealed. A packer
is generally comprised of two parts. The dropper which is generated by the packer
application, is what gets distributed to the end user. This application handles the evasion
of the antivirus application as well the payload delivery - which is usually contained
within the application. To build a custom packer the following high level strategy can
be implemented by a malware author. The author first selects a method for compressing
the binary. This may be as simple as the zip or a custom implementation. Once this is
selected, an application is built that is known as the packer. This will accept a binary
as an input, compress it and then inject it into the dropper application. The selection of
a compression mechanism is optional but is highly recommended as it provides another
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level of obfuscation. The dropper application can be built in two ways. The dropper will
be built as a distinct and separate binary which will manage the extraction and execution
of the packed code. The alternative and more complicated method is to build a code
stub which is injected along with the packed binary into any benign application that may
already exist on an end user’s system. This second method is more effective since the
application may already be white-listed for execution on the end user’s system and does
not provide as easy a signature to detect. Depending on the type of dropper that the
attacker wishes to use, the packer will need to be built to either: generate a dropper
application or just a code stub that will be injected into the transport application.
Table 5.19: Dropper Type Pros vs Cons
Dropper Type Pro Con
Static Binary Simpler To Build Static Binary Easily Detected
Dynamic Binary Dynamic Binary Harder To Detect Complicated Build Process
With the aforementioned knowledge in mind, it was decided that the initial type of
dropper was selected for use (i.e. a static binary that had data only injected). This
method of packing was selected because it is both simpler and less prone to error. The
stub and data injection is significantly more complicated as it requires rewriting different
parts (the original entry point) of the binary which is required to access the injected
stub. Furthermore, the benefits of the stub injection (which is a dynamic binary) only
assists evasion when used as part of a self-replicating package which is required by either
worms or viruses. Since the binaries that are submitted for testing have to be submitted
manually, changing the dropper executable is simply achieved by using different open
source projects while adding the required extraction code.
5.8.1 Implementing the custom packer
The tools for building a packer application can be built using high level languages such as
C# or Python or another scripting language as is common among certain malware authors
(Borello et al., 2010). The alternative is to build the application in a lower level systems
level type language such as C. The trade-off between the choice of languages comes down
to how fast the author can implement the packer in a given language. Higher level scripting
languages that are able to compile to executable binary applications are the most likely
to be selected as it means the runtime requirements on the end user’s system are lower.
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In the same chain of reasoning, lower level languages provide fairly independent runtime
requirements by default, but at the cost of reimplementing a number of simple functions
provided by higher level functions. To speed up the build process, it was determined
that a higher level language would be used. The higher level language that was selected
was the C# language which runs on the Microsoft .Net framework. There is no specific
reason for using C# other than ease of use and portability. The same application packer
could be built by another rapid application development language and will be left for
future work. By building the packer using C# and using the packer / dropper method
of building a packer, there is a decreased chance of building the packer incorrectly. The
dropper application will be implemented by building a template binary that has a fixed
resource signature. This signature will then be found when the packer is executed and
replaced with the packed content.
5.8.2 Dropper Tests
As explained in section 2.9.4, packers are composed of two parts. For the dropper tests,
the part of the application that is considered the packer will not be tested as there is
nothing that can be considered malicious in the packer application. The tests described
below will be for the dropper that will be executed on an end user’s system. The structure
of the tests below will be executed in the same order as listed in Table 4.14. The dropper
that will be used for all the tests is generated by running the packer binary while using
each of the binaries listed in Table 4.14 as the source. The output from this application
is what will be submitted for final testing.
5.8.3 Test with benign application
The testing will begin with a benign application, this is used to determine if the antivirus
application is detecting the malicious code or the evasion wrapper. Once the benign
binary is packed and submitted to VirusTotal, the results in Table 5.20 are noted. These
results indicate (excluding one antivirus) that none of the other applications detected the
binary as malicious.
Table 5.20: Benign Application Scan Results
SHA256 ea39f07cf220. . .
File name demo.exe
Detection ratio 1 / 49
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Table 5.21: Benign Application AV Scan Results
Antivirus Result
CMC Hoax.Win32.BadJoke.ScreenFlicker!O
5.8.4 Final packer test with Metasploit binary
As with the previous test, we prepare the dropper for upload but instead of using the
generic calculator application, we use the Metasploit testing binary. The scan results from
uploading this binary can be found below. Note: the Metasploit that is packed does not
contain any exploit opcodes. The results from packing the malicious binaries with the
custom packer can be found in Table 4.
Table 5.22: Metasploit Scan Details
SHA256 df06d7bc21f6. . .
File name SelfExtractor.exe
Detection ratio 2 / 49
Table 5.23: Metasploit AV Detection Test Results
Anti-virus Result
Avast Win32:Malware-gen
Malwarebytes Backdoor.Bot.gen
5.9 Reports
As mentioned previously in subsection 4.3.2, the eicar file could not be used for any of
the tests and as a result it is not covered in further detail for the rest of the section
5.9.1 Existing Packer Reports
UPX Metasploit Basic Test Results: Looking at the tabulated results in Table 25
the basic Metasploit scan, while being wrapped with UPX, had an increased detection
rate from the original detection rate of six for the gcc test. When looking at the tests for
the pre-compiled binary we do gain a small decrease in the detection rate, though this
is attributed to the small number of scanners detecting the packers signatures instead of
the enclosed payload.
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UPX Metasploit opcode Test Results: In Table 26 we see a significant increase
in detection by antivirus engines. The majority of the antivirus engines seem to detect
the occurrence of malicious behaviour and flag the binary as a generic malicious binary.
The behaviour that is detected according to the F-Secure antivirus index2 is that of a
generic Trojan application. This labeling of a Trojan does not conclusively point to the
antivirus application detecting the internal payload since packer applications are generally
associated with Trojans.
ASPack Metasploit Basic Code Test Results: Detection ratio: 6 / 55
When being wrapped with the ASPack packer and submitting the application to VirusTotal
we see a minimal detection ratio. This is most likely due to the payload being benign and
the antivirus applications simply detecting packers stub application.
ASPack Metasploit Opcode Test Results: Detection ratio: 10 / 55
When the Metasploit binary containing the opcodes to execute an application is wrapped
with the ASPack packer. The application submitted to VirusTotal presents a slight
increase in detections compared to the non opcode embedded version. This increased
detection is possibly due to the sample application launching the calculator application
which is considered a test case of many malicious pieces of malware.
PECompact Metasploit Basic Code Test Results: Detection ratio: 11 / 55
The metasploit binary that is packed using the PECompact application has a higher
detection rate than the ASPack packer. Since we are looking at the basic payload which
does not launch any application, the antivirus engines are once again showing signatures
for generic Trojans and backdoors. This is an indication that the antivirus engines are
detecting the packers signature and not the internal payload.
PECompact Metasploit Opcode Test Results: Detection ratio: 11 / 55
The Metasploit binary with the included payload did not result in an increase in detection
rate. This further confirms that the antivirus engines were simply detecting the packers
signature that is emitted by default when packing an application.
5.9.2 Custom Packer Reports
Benign Test Results As expected none of the antivirus engines detect the wrapper
application as malicious (only one engine flags the application as a joke application). The
joke detection is possibly because the application launched is the calculator application.
2http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/trojan_w32_graftor.shtml
65
Metasploit Test Results From the results we can see the only two antivirus engines
detect the packed binary as malicious. It maybe be possible that the payload will be
detected at a later stage. Getting the payload past the first level of scanning is a significant
win.
5.10 Summary
As mentioned previously in section 2.5, packers were one of the first methods used to
evade antivirus engines. Consequently, it is the first method of evasion that was tested.
After using the existing packers to pack the test binaries, the results were submitted to
VirusTotal for scanning and the following results were found and compiled into Table
5.24. The results in table 5.24 represent the final score from virus total indicating the
number of antivirus engines that detected the binary as malicious, while the percentage
point difference compared to the original baseline binary is shown in brackets next to the
scan results. These percentage points indicate whether there was an increase or decrease
in the number of detections, with negative values indicating an increase in the number of
detections, while positive numbers indicate a decrease in the number of detections.
Table 5.24: Detection Rates Side By Side Summary
Detection Rate (Percentage Points)
Binary UPX ASPack PECompact Custom Packer PP Average
Metasploit Base 10/55 (22 pp) 6/55 (29 pp) 11/55 (20 pp) 2/55 (36 pp) 27 pp
Metasploit Opcode 39/55 (-29 pp) 29/55 (-11 pp) 15/55 (15 pp) 22/55 (2 pp) -6 pp
Malicious Binary 1 29/55 (35 pp) 16/55 (58 pp) 18/55 (55 pp) 13/55 (64 pp) 53 pp
Malicious Binary 2 28/55 (44 pp) 18/55 (62 pp) 18/55 (62 pp) 14/55 (69 pp) 59 pp
Malicious Binary 3 0/55 (0 pp) 19/55 (60 pp) 19/55 (60 pp) 18/55 (62 pp) 46 pp
Averages 14 pp 40 pp 42 pp 47 pp 36 pp
There are a number of points that can be extracted from the Table 5.24. Working
through the results from the top of the table: none of the packers were able to process the
eicar file except for the custom packer which still had a zero detection ratio. The reason
for none of the packers being able to process the file is because they require a valid PE
binary to modify. Since the eicar file is just a text file that works as a COM file as well, it
cannot actually be modified. The benign binary was tested with each packer to establish
if the antivirus engines were detecting the malicious code or the wrapper code. Following
the benign tests, the Metasploit base file was tested. This is the original baseline file
that was selected in section 4 after a number of other options were originally considered
and subsequently eliminated as options. The baseline binary started with a base detection
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rate of 22/55. This detection rate either dropped or increased when different packers were
independently applied. On average the number of detections dropped by 27 percentage
points across all the packers. While there was a large drop in this initial scan, it was
attributed to the significant change of the baseline binary coupled with the fact that
it had no malicious code embedded in it, indicating most antivirus engines ignored the
binary.
To test if adding malicious code to the application would change the detection rates,
the next test added exploit opcodes to launch a benign application in a non-conventional
manner. As mentioned previously, the next step was to add some additional code to
the template binary to make it seem more malicious to the antivirus applications. After
adding the code and scanning it, the new template binary had a total detection rate of
23/55 with only one more antivirus engine detecting the binary as malicious. While only
one antivirus engine detected the new template binary as malicious, after packing the
template binary with each packer and then submitting it for testing a new pattern is
discovered. For UPX and ASPack the detection rate increased instead of decreasing as
expected, with an average increase of 20 percentage points in the number of detections
across the two packers. While the detection rates for the custom packer only got reduced
by two percentage points, only PEcompact gained a significant reduction in the number
of detections with a decrease of 15 percentage points.
A final test was performed to determine the effectiveness of working with a baseline
binary. This final test was to use all the packers to pack a set of known malicious binaries
and compare the results. This final test compromises rows three, four and five in Table
5.24 for the three selected malicious binaries indicated in section4.4. Binary number one
had an average reduction in the number of detections of 53 percentage points across the
four packers. The average reduction in number of detections for binary number two was
increased to 59 percentage points with binary number three having a reduction of 46
percentage points in the number of detections across the three packers that were able to
pack it (UPX was not able to pack the binary). This resulted in an overall reduction of
52 percentage points in the number of detections across the three binaries.
The custom packer performed marginally well by gaining the lowest detection rate of
all the packers for each of the scans. The packer could have been built differently to achieve
better results, but the aim of using the custom packer was not to gain a perfect bypass,
but rather to show that it could perform better than existing packers with minimal work
involved. For malware authors this is good news as it means that building a custom packer
as part of the release plan, will result in the malware being able to evade the vast majority
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of the antivirus engines employed. Based on the results in Table 5.24, malware authors
that do not have the required development skills can still use existing packers to gain
some reduction in the detection of the malware they deploy. In conclusion, this chapter
dealt with the initial set of tests and demonstrated how the tests should be performed as
well as their effectiveness against the antivirus engines available at the time. The next
chapter will discuss the encryption evasion technique and demonstrate the effectiveness
of encrypting a malicious binary to evade modern antivirus applications.
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Chapter 6
Evasion : Encrypters
6.1 Introduction
Similar to the work described in chapter 5, this chapter will perform a set of tests to
gauge the effectiveness of modern antivirus applications in detecting a set of protocol
binaries wrapped in the encryption evasion technique as introduced in section 2.6. This
chapter will use the processes and methodologies listed in Chapters 3 and 4 to test the
effectiveness of the encryption evasion technique.
6.2 Hypothesis
It is expected that the antivirus application tested will be looking for specific signatures
and therefore, encrypting the baseline application will change the application’s signature.
This should, in turn, result in a lower detection rate. It is expected that the detections
raised by the antivirus application will be due to the signatures of the encryption stubbs
not the signature of the baseline application. Based on the results from Chapter 5, this
chapter will attempt to match the reduction gained by the packers or gain an increase
in the reduction. Further, detections recorded in the test results belong to signatures
generated by the packer and is not the signature of the baseline application. This will be
demonstrated by the use of a benign application which produces no malicious detections
when submitted prior to encryption. The benign application will then be detected as
malicious after being encrypted and submitted for testing.
6.2.1 Goals
The results obtained from testing in the previous chapter demonstrate that an average
reduction in the number of detections of at least 10 percentage points can be gained
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against the antivirus engines that detect the baseline tests as malicious. As such the goal
for this chapter will also attempt to achieve an average reduction of at least 10 percentage
points.
6.3 Tests
The testing will be performed in two phases. The first phase of testing will test a set of
existing encryptors that exist in the wild and are publicly accessible. This will provide us
with a base from which our custom encrypter can be compared. The second phase will
be to test a custom implementation of an encrypter tool as discussed in the section 5.8.
The creation of a custom implementation will allow us to compare the results of using a
packer that generates a known signature as part of its decryption routine which may be
already known to antivirus engines versus a custom application that would not have a
recorded signature. This in turn can be used to determine if the antivirus applications are
looking for signatures in the encrypting applications or if they are looking for signatures
in the malicious binaries or if the antivirus applications are using heuristics to perform
their detection.
As for the tests that will be executed and the order of the tests, they are listed in the
Table 4.5. The order and tests are the same as those executed for Chapter 5.8. A benign
application will first be tested to determine if the antivirus applications are scanning for
signatures in the decryption routines. Once the benign test is completed, the baseline
test will be executed using the baseline application selected in the section 4 on baseline
binary selection.
6.4 Existing Encrypters
For the baseline testing of the existing encryption application, two encryptors that are
available and run on modern operating systems will be selected for use.. The two
applications that were selected are Hyperion1 and PEScrambler2. The two applications
provide the functionality required to be tested - which is to wrap a binary by encrypting
its content and then appending a decryption stub to the encrypted binary so that the
binary can be decrypted on execution.
1http://nullsecurity.net/tools/binary.html
2https://code.google.com/p/pescrambler/
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Table 6.1: Encrypters to be tested
Encypter Version
PEScrambler v0.1
Hyperion v1.0
6.5 Hyperion Background
The Hyperion packer3 is the first of the encryptors to be tested. The encryptor was
selected because it is one of the few remaining publicly available encryptors that work on
a modern operating system without the need for code modification. As mentioned in the
introduction, the tests will start with a benign test and then move on to the baseline test
and finally a malicious test.
6.5.1 Benign Test
The first test is to set the baseline for the future tests. It will allow for verification if
an antivirus engine detects a binary as malicious purely based on a byte signature in the
decryption stub. As discussed in 4.3.1, the application that was selected was the 32bit
version of cmd.exe as the application has no known side effects and is executable on all
modern operating systems (without the need for dedicated dependencies). The baseline
scan for cmd.exe is found in the Table 4.2 in the section 4.3.1 and as expected is not
reported as malicious at all.
After encrypting the application and then submitting it for testing, the results as
listed in Table 6.2 show a detection ratio of 20/55. From this it can determined that the
antivirus engines that are detecting this binary as malicious are simply scanning for a
known byte signature that would be generated by the Hyperion Application.
Table 6.2: Hyperion Benign Scan
SHA256 f70cebe27268. . .
File name cmdhp.exe
Detection ratio 20/55
6.5.2 Baseline Test
The following section covers process of encrypting and then scanning the baseline binary
with Hyperion. The scans for the baseline binary can be found in table 6.3 which contains
3http://nullsecurity.net/tools/binary.html
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no exploit code, this is followed by a scan of the baseline binary with exploit embedded
as seen in table 6.4.
Table 6.3: Baseline Encrypted Scan with Hyperion
SHA256 a3080b3c97d9. . .
File name template x86 windowshp.exe.report
Detection ratio 23/55
When compared to the previous test the results in Table 6.3 show only a small increase
of 2 percentage points in the number of detections. This indicates that only three of the
anti-virus engines are looking at the end result of the decryption process. The small
increase could be attributed to the template being inert and as such not triggering any
heuristics for the antivirus applications.
6.5.3 Hyperion Baseline Scan with Opodes
Table 6.4: Exploit Enabled Baseline Encrypted Scan with Hyperion
SHA256 900a0b4fcb6c. . .
File name template x86 windows ophp.exe.report
Detection ratio 23/55
After submitting the template binary with the opcodes embedded for scanning, the results
found in Table 6.4 indicate no increase in detection rates. The verification that the same
file was not submitted for both tests can be achieved by comparing the sha256 hash values.
6.5.4 Malware Test
With Hyperion, only one sample of the three listed in the malware test (Table 4.9) was able
to encrypt successfully. The sample that was able to encrypt successfully was Malicious
Binary 2 (the Zeus Bot) and as a result it is the only malware sample tested in this
section. Malicious Binary 2 :
Table 6.5: Zeus bot Malware Scan with Hyperion
SHA256 0c1e63a8d1a5. . .
File name hp VirusShare 9fc364ccffe540c627733222641259c9.sf.report
Detection ratio 26/54
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When comparing the results from the malware submission in Table 6.5 it can be seen
that there is a significant drop in detection rates of 47 percentage points when compared
to the original scan results for the malicious binary. Unfortunately because there are so
few malicious binaries that can be successfully encrypted with Hyperion it is difficult to
extract a definitive comparison.
6.6 PEScambler Background
The final encryptor to be tested is the encryptor known as PEScrambler4. The original
repository was available at5, but this is no longer open to the public. As with the Hyperion
tests, this section will begin with the benign test to set a baseline and determine if the
antivirus engines have a known byte signature for the encryptors decryption stub.
6.6.1 Benign Test
Table 6.6: PEScrambler Benign Scan
SHA256 fb69c4d27df8. . .
File name cmdpe.exe.sf.report
Detection ratio 7/55
While there is a slight increase in detection rates (seven antivirus engines detected the
benign application as malicious), in comparison to the Hyperion test, the PEScrambler
had a significantly lower detection ratio for the benign application (7/55 versus 20/55).
6.6.2 Baseline Test
The following section covers the process of encrypting and then scanning the encrypted
binary with PEScambler. The scans for the baseline binary in Table 6.7 with no exploit
code embedded is followed by a scan of the baseline binary with exploit embedded in
Table 6.8.
After submitting the encrypted baseline template for scanning, the results in Table
6.7 indicate that there is a decrease of 18 percentage points in the number of detections
when compared to the baseline template scans.
4https://github.com/Veil-Framework/Veil-Evasion/tree/master/tools/pescrambler/
5https://code.google.com/p/pescrambler/
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Table 6.7: Baseline Encrypted Scan with PEScrambler
SHA256 aa694414c81c. . .
File name template x86 windowspe.exe.report
Detection ratio 12/55
6.6.3 PEScrambler Baseline Scan With Opcodes
Table 6.8: Exploit Enabled Baseline Encrypted Scan with PEScrambler
SHA256 59275c39364b. . .
File name template x86 windows oppe.exe.report
Detection ratio 13/54
After submitting the template with the opcodes embedded for scanning, the results in
Table 6.8 indicate a decrease of 18 percentage points in the detection rate when compared
to the template opcode binaries original scan results.
6.6.4 Malware Test
The following section details the process of encrypting a live malware sample and then
scanning the encrypted binary. The three samples below were encrypted successfully with
PEScrambler. The application does not provide any information on why it is not able
to encrypt an application and as a result, only the successful malware samples will be
listed below. After submitting the encrypted copy of malicious binary 1 for scanning and
analysing the results in Table 5, it is found that there is a decrease of 73 percentage points
in the rate detection. This is a significant result in the decrease of detection rates and
when compared to all other tests completed up this point, it is the highest decrease in
detection.
After submitting the encrypted copy of malicious binary 2 for scanning and analysing the
results in Table 5, it is found that there is a decrease of 56 percentage points in the rate
of detection. While this decrease in rate of detection is noteworthy, it does not compare
as favourably to the decrease in the detection rates for malicious binary 1. One possible
explanation is that Zeus malware authors may have previously encrypted copies of the
malware with PEScrambler.
After submitting the encrypted copy of malicious binary 3 for scanning and analysing
the results in Table 5, it is found that there is a decrease in the detection rates of 78
percentage points. As with malicious binary 1, a high reduction in the detection rates
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is once again observed and further points to the possibility that the Zeus scan was an
oddity.
6.7 Custom Encryptor
The implementation of encryptors is very similar to that of packers. The Microsoft .Net
Framework (.Net) is used and the encrypted data is stored in the dropper binary. In
the same manner as the packer, the encryptor is built using the .Net platform with the
C# programming language. Furthermore, since the encryptor works in a similar method
to the packer, the majority of the packers code will be used and then expanded (where
needed) to add the encryption layer. As with the packer, the encrypter is split into two
parts, namely the encryptor and the dropper. Similarly to the packer, the dropper will
store the payload as well as handle the decryption and final execution of the binary that
was packed. The encryption used in the implementation is AES. Further, the payload is
encrypted directly and is not zipped before encryption.
In the hypothesis it was stated that we would be testing the techniques used to
evade an antivirus, instead of testing the specific implementations of particular techniques
against modern antivirus engines. Consequently, a custom implementation of an encryptor
will need to be built which will test the second of the two evasion techniques that was
mentioned previously in 2.5.3.
The two basic techniques that were built and tested, are the packer and encryption
techniques. These two methods are very similar because they are different stages of
the evolution of basic evasion techniques. The testing of metamorphism as well as the
other more advanced evasion techniques will need to be completed as a separate research
undertaking owing to the depth and complexity of these techniques. The encryptor tests
are similar to that of the packer with a slight change: instead of performing a dummy
scan with no valid payload, testing will start directly with a payload that has some basic
opcodes to launch the calculator application in Windows. As with the packer tests, the
tests are not meant to evaluate the encryptor, rather to test the dropper application which
contains the payload.
6.7.1 Baseline Test
When testing the encrypter with the basic template payload the results as found in table
6.9 were observed.
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Table 6.9: Baseline Scan With Custom Encrypter
SHA256 4cce95b26fd4. . .
File name SelfDecrypter.exe
Detection ratio 0 / 49
The scan shows that none of the antivirus engines detected the payload that was
embedded in the binary as malicious. Furthermore the decryption stubb application was
not detected as malicious either because it was a custom application.
6.7.2 Baseline With Opcodes Test
A final scan was done with a payload that executed basic opcodes in order to launch the
Windows calculator application. This method of executing code is technically considered
more malicious and is likely to trigger more alarms for the antivirus engine. The results
from this scan be found in Table 6.10 and as with the previous test, none of the antivirus
engines detected the binary as malicious.
Table 6.10: Baseline Scan With Opcodes
SHA256: 4aad495e7176. . .
File name: SelfDecrypter OP.exe
Detection ratio: 0 / 49
6.8 Summary
After performing all the tests for the chapter, the results are shown in Table 6.11. The
table indicates a baseline by which to compare the rest of the data when determining if
the antivirus engines are detecting the encryptor’s signature as malicious or if the actual
embedded binary as malicious. Based on the hypothesis and observation in the previous
results indicated in Table 5.24, it was expected that a number of antivirus applications
would detect the decryption code as malicious. The results from the benign scan confirms
this notion by indicationg that both Hyperion and PEScrambler had malicious detections
when encrypting the previously clean benign application. Note: The benign scores not
considered in averages for table 6.11 and is simply displayed for easier comparison.
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Table 6.11: Encryption Comparison Summary
Binary Hyperion PEScrambler PP Average
Benign 20/55 (-36 pp) 7/55 (-13 pp) -25 pp
Metasploit 23/55 (-2 pp) 12/55 (18 pp) 8 pp
Metasploit OP 23/55 (0 pp) 13/55 (18 pp) 9 pp
Malicious Binary 1 N/A 8/55 (73 pp) 37 pp
Malicious Binary 2 26/55 (47 pp) 21/55 (56 pp) 52 pp
Malicious Binary 3 N/A 9/55 (78 pp) 39 pp
Percentage Point Average 9 pp 49 pp 29 pp
After the benign scan was completed, the next two scans performed were the Metasploit
and Metasploit OP scans. These scans were meant to test an antivirus engines ability to
detect the flagged binaries. After performing the scan with Hyperion, an increase of 2
percentage points were observed in the detection rates for the base Metasploit template
binary. The PEScrambler showed a decrease of 18 percentage points in its detection
rates. The increase in the detection rates of Hyperion is most likely due to the common
use of Hyperion in a number of evasion frameworks - which have resulted in an increased
detection rate, when coupled with the already malicious Metasploit template. For this
reason, the increase in detection is reasonably expected.
The decrease in the detection rates is due, in part, to the opposite effect observed by the
Hyperion scan. This effect is one in which a known encryptor increases the detection rate
while an unknown encryptor decreases the detection rate. Even though PEScrambler is
open source, it is not as popular as Hyperion when being used in the wild. For this reason,
when encrypting an application it is able to provide evasion capabilities as expected.
When performing the scans with the OP code template binary the following results
were observed. When scanned with Hyperion no change in percentage points were observed
between the baseline OP binary and the encrypted binary. The same results as the original
baseline scan were observed for the OP code binary with a decrease of 18 percentage points.
For the malicious binary tests, two of the binaries could not be encrypted with
Hyperion. The reason why Hyperion could not encrypt these binaries is not provided
by Hyperion. In the case of the one binary that was able to encrypt successfully, there
was a decrease of 47 percentage points in detection rates. In the case of PEScrambler, all
the binaries were able to encrypt successfully and resulted in an average reduction of 69
percentage points across the three malicious binaries tested.
There was an odd case observed with the tests for Malicious Binary 2 which showed a
higher than normal detection rate for PEScramble when compared to the other binaries.
It is assumed that this is because the binary that was tested has previously used this
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specific encryptor in the wild, and a larger number of antivirus engines have signatures
for its encrypted form. Overall the results for the malicious binary detection tests were
successful with a reduction in detection rates of greater than 6.
Comparing the results from all the tests performed, it can be observed that the
encryptors were more successful than the packers (previously tested in Table 5.24). This
success is largely owing to PEScrambler which also has a high detection rate, similar to
the custom encryptor with the static key which was almost never detected.
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated the effectiveness of encrypting a malicious
binary in a manner so that it can evade an antivirus application. The goal of an
average reduction of 10 percentage points was achieved with an average reduction of 29
percentage points. The chapter used the processes and methodologies detailed in Chapter
3 and Chapter 4. Having demonstrated the effectiveness of encryption, the next chapter
will attempt to achieve better results by combining the techniques used in this chapter
(encryption) and the techniques used in Chapter 5 (packing).
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Chapter 7
Evasion : Combination
7.1 Introduction
Chapters 5 and 6 tested the packing and encryption techniques using the test protocol
applications as defined in chapter 4. This chapter will investigate if combining a packer
and an encryptor on the same binary will reduce the detection rate. The testing will be
performed in two sets, evaluating whether packing a binary first or encrypting the binary
first produces a binary that has a higher percentage of evasion. These tests are performed
since they provide different output binaries depending on which evasion technique is
applied first.
7.2 Hypothesis
By combining both the packer and encryption applications on the same binary, the
detection rates will be reduced when compared to the original single instance tests. There
are two possible outcomes that are expected from this test. The first possible outcome
is that there will be a positive reaction to the combination of the packer and encryptor,
which will result in a reduced detection rate when compared to the original tests. The
second possible outcome is that the antivirus engines detect either the packer or encryptor
resulting in an increased detection rate.
7.2.1 Goals
In this chapter it is favorably expected that based on tests in the previous two chapters
in which the packers and encrypters were tested separately, the percentage point changes
can be found in tables 7.1 and 7.2.
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Table 7.1: Expected Goals For Pack First Tests
Pack first ASPack UPX PECompact
Baseline 13pp 11pp 10pp
Baseline OP -5pp -14pp 7pp
Malicious Binary 1 25pp 15pp 25pp
Malicious Binary 2 30pp 22pp 31pp
Malicious Binary 3 30pp 0pp 30pp
Average 19pp 7pp 21pp
Table 7.2: Expected Goals For Encrypt First Tests
Encrypt First Hyperion PEScrambler
Baseline -1pp 9pp
Baseline OP 0pp 9pp
Malicious Binary 1 0pp 35pp
Malicious Binary 2 22pp 25pp
Malicious Binary 3 0pp 39pp
Average 4.2pp 23.4pp
Tests that have a 0 percentage point change recorded in tables 7.1 and 7.2, indicate
binaries that were not able to encrypted or packed previously and are unlikely to have a
different result when combined with the alternate packer or encryptor. The remainder of
the binaries were give a percentage point goal of half the of the original tests results, this
is due to the possibility that the combination of a packer or encryptor is likely to affect
the original detection score. While its not possible to say exactly how it will affect the
original score, it is expected that in most cases it will cause the binary to be flagged more
often. In cases where it is not flagged it is then expected that the score will demonstrate
better evasion scores.
7.3 Tests
The tests will be performed in two sets. First the binary will be packed and then encrypted
for each of the existing packers and encryptors. This will be followed by a set of tests
for the opposite order, the binary will be encrypted and then packed. By performing
both sets of tests, it can be verified as to what exactly the antivirus engines are checking
for. If the tests results in both tests are exactly the same, then it will be assumed that
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the antivirus engines are actually extracting the packed data and allowing the encrypted
data to hit this disk. If the tests result in differing data, then it can be assumed that
the antivirus applications are only verifying one level of maliciousness and reporting this
first level of scanning only. The testing in the upcoming sections will test the binaries
listed in the Table 4.14. It should be noted that the tests in this chapter will only be
performed when the binaries that are being tested can be packed and encrypted. If either
one is not possible, then the binary will be excluded from that test as it will have the
same results as the original test performed in either the Chapter 5 on packing or Chapter
6 on encrypting.
7.4 Pack-First Tests
This section will be broken into the subsections listed in Table 7.3 which deals with a
cross paired test between all the packers and encryptors previously covered in Chapters
5 and 6.
Table 7.3: Listing of Pack First Tests
Sub Section Binary First Packed With Result Is Then Encrypted With
7.4.1 UPX Hyperion
7.4.2 UPX PEScrambler
7.4.3 ASPack Hyperion
7.4.4 ASPack PEScrambler
7.4.5 PECompact Hyperion
7.4.6 PECompact PEScrambler
7.4.1 UPX - Hyperion
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of UPX and Hyperion are
found in Table 12. The base template had a marginal increase of 7 percentage points,
this is probably the same as the Hyperion increase. The opcode template had a slight
increase in detection of 2 percentage points. The first malicious binary was incapable of
being packed using UPX and as such was not considered for testing. Malicious Binary
number 2 had a reasonable reduction in detection rates of 55 percentage points which is
on par with the original UPX reduction results. The third malicious binary had the same
results as the first binary in terms of reduction of detection rates, with a reduction of 53
percentage points.
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7.4.2 UPX - PEScrambler
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of UPX and PEScrambler
are found in Table 13. When scanning the baseline binary with a combination of UPX and
PEScrambler, a reduction in detection rates of 22 percentage points was observed when
compared to the original scan results of the baseline binary. When scanning template base
with the combination of UPX and PEScrambler, there is an increase of 25 percentage
points in the detection rate which contradicts what was expected after observing the
previous scan results. When scanning Malicious Binary number 1 with the combination
of UPX and PEScrambler, it showed a decrease of 35 percentage points in its detection
rate and was close to the original PEScrambler detection results. When scanning the
combination of UPX and PEScrambler, Malicious Binary number 2 showed a decrease of
44 percentage points in its detection rate was close to the original PEScrambler detection
results. When scanning the combination of UPX and PEScrambler, Malicious Binary
number 3 showed a decrease of 78 percentage points in its detection rate and was close
to the original PEScrambler results.
7.4.3 ASPack - Hyperion
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of ASPack and Hyperion are
found in Table 14. The base Metasploit template scan shows an increase of 4 percentage
points in its detection rates when manipulated by ASPack and Hyperion. This is the
same effect as observed for UPX and Hyperion, with the exception that the increase is
not as large. The Metasploit opcode scan shows a tiny increase in detection rates as with
the previous test with an increase of 2 percentage points. It is interesting to note that
the increased percentage is exactly the same as the UPX and Hyperion test. As with
previous tests, there was a significant decrease in the detection rates of the malicious
binaries. The first of the malicious binaries was not able to be packed and as such had no
results. However a decrease of 55 percentage points for Malicious Binary number 2. As
with previous tests, there was a significant decrease in the detection rates of the malicious
binaries, with a decrease of 47 percentage points in detection rates for Malicious Binary
number 3.
7.4.4 ASPack - PEScrambler
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of ASPack and PEScrambler
are found in Table 15. When performing the combination test with ASPack and PEScrambler
on the base template, a significant reduction in detection rates of 27 percentage points
was observed. For the first time this result shows a lower detection rate than that of
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the original PEScrambler or ASPack test results. When performing the test with the
Metasploit opcode binary, a significant reduction in detection rates of 18 percentage
points was observed. When performing the test with the first malicious binary an average
reduction of 49 percentage points in detection rates is observed. When performing the
test with the second malicious binary, a significant reduction of 62 percentage points in
detection rates is observed. The final test performed with Malicious Binary number 3 also
results in a significant reduction of 82 percentage points in detection rates. This is also
the first time that one of the malicious binaries has shown such a high reduction in its
rate of detection. It is greater than that observed in the original PEScrambler or ASPack
results.
7.4.5 PECompact - Hyperion
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of PECompact and Hyperion
are found in Table 16. The Baseline Metasploit test with the current combination resulted
in an increased detection rate of 7 percentage points in the rate of detection. When
performed with the Baseline Metasploit opcode binary using the current combination,
an increase of 5 percentage points in the rate of detection was observed. When testing
the malicious binaries, only malicious binary number two and malicious binary number
three successfully packed and encrypted with the current combination being tested. These
binaries showed a decrease of 49 percentage points in their detection rates.
7.4.6 PECompact - PEScrambler
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of PECompact and PEScrambler
are found in Table 17. The basic template was not able to successfully have the packer
and encryptor evasion applied. When scanned, the Metasploit opcode template showed a
reduction of 29 percentage points in the rate of detections. All three binaries successfully
had the current combination applied to them and showed a reduction of 82, 69 and 80
percentage points in their detection rates of each of the binaries respectively.
Table 7.4: Summary Table For Pack First
ASPack PECompact UPX
Binary Hyperion PEScrambler Hyperion PEScrambler Hyperion PEScrambler
Baseline 24/55 (-4 pp) 7/55 (27 pp) 26/55 (-7 pp) 0/55 (0 pp) 26/55 (-7 pp) 10/55 (22 pp)
Baseline OP 24/55 (-2 pp) 13/55 (18 pp) 26/55 (-5 pp) 7/55 (29 pp) 24/55 (-2 pp) 37/55 (-25 pp)
Malicious Binary 1 0/55 (0 pp) 21/55 (49 pp) 0/55 (0 pp) 3/55 (82 pp) 0/55 (0 pp) 29/55 (35 pp)
Malicious Binary 2 22/55 (55 pp) 18/55 (62 pp) 25/55 (49 pp) 14/55 (69 pp) 22/55 (55 pp) 28/55 (44 pp)
Malicious Binary 3 26/55 (47 pp) 7/55 (82 pp) 25/55 (49 pp) 8/55 (80 pp) 23/55 (53 pp) 9/55 (78 pp)
Percentage Point Average 19 pp 48 pp 17 pp 52 pp 20 pp 31 pp
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7.5 Encrypt-First Tests
This section will test the use of a combination of packer and encryptors as in the previous
section 7.4. The difference in the tests can be found in the order in which the packers
and encryptors are applied. The previous chapter applied the packers first while this
chapter applies the encryptors first. This section will be broken into the subsections
listed in Table 7.5 which covers a cross paired test between all the encryptors and packers
previously covered in Chapters 5 and 6.
Table 7.5: Listing of Pack First Tests
Sub Section Binary First Encrypted With Result Is Then Packed With
7.5.1 Hyperion ASPack
7.5.2 Hyperion PECompact
7.5.3 Hyperion UPX
7.5.4 PEScrambler ASPack
7.5.5 PEScrambler PECompact
7.5.6 PEScrambler UPX
7.5.1 Hyperion - ASPack
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of Hyperion and ASPack
are found in Table 18. When the base Metasploit template is scanned, a decrease of 11
percentage points in its detection rates was observed. While this is the first test for the
“encrypt first” tests, when compared to “pack first” tests it is a promising result as it
shows a decrease instead of an increase which was the observed result for many of the
“pack first” scans. The next test which is the Metasploit opcode scan. It demonstrated a
decrease of 15 percentage points in its detection rates. While this is only marginally better
than the base template scan, it shows better results than the alternate paired scan where
ASPack and Hyperion were employed. From the three malicious binaries only two were
able to have the current combination applied to them. These binaries (Binary number 2
and Binary number 3) showed a reduction of 71 and 73 percentage points respectively in
their detection rates.
7.5.2 Hyperion - PECompact
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of Hyperion and PECompact
are found in Table 19. The base template and the opcode code template both successfully
had the current combination applied to them and showed a reduction of 20 and 13
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percentage points respectively in their detection rates. As with the previous test in
subsection 7.5.1, only two of the malicious binaries had the current combination successfully
applied to them. These binaries (malicious binary number 2 and malicious binary number
3) both showed a significant reduction of 78 and 80 percentage points in their detection
rates.
7.5.3 Hyperion - UPX
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of Hyperion and UPX are
found in Table 20. The base template and the opcode code template both successfully had
the current combination applied to them and showed a reduction of 5 and 7 percentage
points respectively in their detection rates. This reduction is the lowest reduction for the
base tests with any of the current ”encrypt first” combinations. Of the three malicious
binaries, only the third malicious binary successfully had the current combination applied
to it. This combination did result in a significant detection rate reduction of 69 percentage
points.
7.5.4 PEScrambler - ASPack
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of PEScrambler and ASPack
are found in Table 21. The base template and the opcode code template both successfully
had the current combination applied to them and showed a reduction in detection rates
of 24 and 29 percentage points respectively in their detection rates. All three of the
malicious binaries were able to have the current combination of evasions applied to it. All
three of the binaries had a significant reduction in detections rates, these were 65, 76 and
95 percentage points respectively in their detection rates. This is the only time a scan has
ever resulted in zero detections. It should be noted that this combination which results in
a 100% reduction only seems to work for Malicious Binary number 3, as the other binaries
that were tested with the same combination did not result in a 100% reduction
7.5.5 PEScrambler - PECompact
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of PEScrambler and PECompact
are found in Table 22. The base template and the opcode code template both successfully
had the current combination applied to them and showed a reduction in detection rates of
20 and 27 percentage points respectively. Of the three malicious binaries, only Malicious
Binary numbers 1 and 2 successfully had the current evasions applied. These binaries
showed a reduction in their detection rates of 78 and 69 percentage points respectively.
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7.5.6 PEScrambler - UPX
The results from scanning the binaries with the combination of PEScrambler and UPX
are found in Table 23. The base template and the opcode code template both successfully
had the current combination applied to them and showed a reduction in its detection
rates of 13 and 24 percentage points respectively. Of the three malicious binaries, only
Malicious Binary 1 and 2 successfully had the current evasions applied. These binaries
showed a reduction in their detection rates of 67 and 56 percentage points respectively.
Table 7.6: Summary Table For Encrypt First
Hyperion PEScrambler
Binary ASPack PECompact UPX ASPack PECompact UPX
Baseline 16/55 (11 pp) 11/55 (20 pp) 19/55 (5 pp) 9/55 (24 pp) 11/55 (20 pp) 15/55 (13 pp)
Baseline OP 15/55 (15 pp) 16/55 (13 pp) 19/55 (7 pp) 7/55 (29 pp) 8/55 (27 pp) 10/55 (24 pp)
Malicious Binary 1 -/55 (0 pp) -/55 (0 pp) -/55 (0 pp) 12/55 (65 pp) 5/55 (78 pp) 11/55 (67 pp)
Malicious Binary 2 13/55 (71 pp) 9/55 (78 pp) -/55 (0 pp) 10/55 (76 pp) 14/55 (69 pp) 21/55 (56 pp)
Malicious Binary 3 12/55 (73 pp) 8/55 (80 pp) 14/55 (69 pp) 0/55 (95 pp) -/55 (0 pp) -/55 (0 pp)
Percentage Point Average 34 pp 38 pp 16 pp 58 pp 39 pp 32 pp
7.6 Summary
After performing all the tests in this chapter the following summary (Table 7.4) can be
drawn to show the effectiveness of each combination across the binaries that were tested.
In the “pack first” tests the binaries were first packed and then encrypted with either
Hyperion or PEScrambler alternatively. The binaries that could not be packed and
encrypted are represented with an N/A in the respective column. The testing showed that
in the end only four combinations of a packer and encryptor did not succeed. Hyperion
showed an averseness to working with packed binaries as it could not modify the flow
correctly and as such would simply fail. This failure to encrypt was only apparent when
testing with the first malicious binary.
When analyzing the results for the ASpack and Hyperion combination, it can be
stated that it performed reasonably well when compared to the average for the expected
goals defined in the beginning of this chapter. The results from tests showed an average
evasion of only 24 percentage points which is greater than the expected average of 19
percentage points. The subsequent ASPack test had much better results with an average
of 48 percentage across the five binaries. This result exceeds expectations and meets the
goal of achieving greater than the 19 percentage points evasion from the original goals.
When analyzing the results for PECompact, the reduction in detection rates is only
just greater than the goal (of 21 percentage points) set out in the starting of the chapter
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for the PECompact packer with an average of 21.5 percentage points across the four
binaries tested. The subsequent test with PEScrambler achieves a much better average
detection rate of 65 percentage points. While only nominally better than the results of
the first packer, it did achieve the best reduction thus far.
The final packer to be tested in the pack’s first section was UPX, which achieved an
average set in the middle of the group’s detection rate with an average reduction of 28
percentage points. It performed only a little worse than the results achieved by ASPack
but performed much better than those achieved by PECompact. Both the combinations
for UPX exceeded the goals that were original defined in the start of the chapter of a 7
percentage point decrease.
After performing the tests in the “pack’s first” section, the next set of tests focused
on first encrypting the binary and then packing the encrypted binary. This method of
testing resulted in a number of binaries that could not be packed. This is mostly the
case when looking at the first malicious binary, but it also occurs in the other malicious
binaries, although less frequently. The outcome of these tests were also the first time that
a 100% evasion was achieved.
When performing the test with Hyperion as the first part of the combination, the
following results were observed. When combined with ASPack the reduction achieved
was higher than the results achieved in the “pack first” tests with an average of 42
percentage points which is greater than the goal that was calculated at the start of the
chapter of 4 percentage points. This is an interesting observation as it showed that simply
changing the order in which the evasions were applied resulted in a reduced detection
rate. The combination with PECompact showed an average reduction of 48 percentage
points, which is above the goal that we originally set in the start of the chapter of 4
percentage points. The UPX combination was the lowest performing of all the packers
with an average reduction of 27 percentage points but still exceeded the original goal of
4 percentage points.
When testing the PEScrambler combinations, the following results were observed. The
ASPack combination resulted in an average reduction of 58 percentage points across the
five binaries which exceeds the goal of 23 percentage points that was defined in the start
of the chapter. This is the highest reduction when comparing all five binary tests. The
PECompact test resulted in a reduction of 49 percentage points in its detection results
when compared against four binaries which exceeded the goal of 23 percentage point
reduction in the number of reduction. The final test with UPX showed the lowest average
reduction of 40 percentage points but still exceeded the goal of a 23 percentage point
reduction. As expected UPX was the lowest rated combination.
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that it was possible to further reduce the
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detection rate by combining the two existing evasion techniques. The next chapter will
conclude with what was observed in the results from this chapter as well as previous
chapters and present a proposal for future work that can be targeted. We will also reiterate
the limitations of the current tests and suggest how they can be further improved.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed that the combination testing approach was valuable and
demonstrated that the combination of packers and encryptors provided better results
than a single evasion technique. This chapter will present a summary of the data from
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The original goals that were set out will then be restated along with
the accompanying results. The chapter will be concluded with a summary and a proposal
for future research of this subject matter.
8.2 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2: In this chapter we introduced a number of key terms that are used in the
rest of the report. Having introduced these terms, the chapter proceeded to provide a
taxonomy on the different techniques used to evade antivirus applications. Following this
explanation, the chapter proceeded to demonstrate how the antivirus industry responded
to the different evasion techniques. The chapter concluded with the related work in the
areas of online scanning and antivirus evaluation research.
Chapter 3: This chapter introduced the options that were available for building the
antivirus testbed in the forms of online and oﬄine testing. The chapter then explored
the benefits and drawbacks of using a custom oﬄine laboratory and indicated that due
to the high demand in resources, it would no longer be pursued as a viable option. This
was followed up by the benefits and drawbacks of using an online system in the form
of the VirusTotal web application. The chapter concluded by indicating that the online
platform would be best suited for testing in the chapters that followed.
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Chapter 4: This chapter introduced the process for testing the malicious binary
evasion techniques. The chapter outlined the process for testing the evasion techniques
by selecting a number of binaries which have a known state before scanning and then
monitoring for an expected state after scanning the binary. The chapter then introduced
and explained why each of the binaries was selected and what their expected outcomes
were. The chapter concluded by selecting the binaries that would be employed in Chapters
5 - 7.
Chapter 5: Chapter 5 described the process of testing the packing evasion techniques
and the resulting outcomes. The results illustrated that packing the malicious binaries
resulted in a significant reduction in detection rates. The results also showed that
none of the packer techniques were able to achieve a 100% evasion against all antivirus
applications.
Chapter 6: This chapter continued the testing of the second of two evasion techniques
as selected in Chapter 2. As with that chapter, the testing showed that by applying
an encryption evasion to the malicious binaries it resulted in a significant reduction in
detection rates. Testing with the custom binaries resulted in an increase of detection
rates. As with the previous chapter, none of the wrappers that were applied resulted in
a 100% reduction in detection.
Chapter 7: The seventh chapter performed a number of tests using a combination of
the evasion techniques mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6. These tests were performed to
determine if stacking the evasion techniques would result in a decreased detection rate.
The results from these tests indicated that when encrypted first, the binaries were more
likely to evade an antivirus engine. This was the first chapter in which a 100% evasion
was observed when running the tests with the PEScrambler and ASPack combination.
8.3 Research Goals
The original research question in chapter 1 set out to investigate whether binaries which
exhibited known virus-like evasion techniques could prove effective against modern antivirus
engines when using on-demand scanning techniques. The results from the tests in chapters
5 - 7 demonstrate that the evasion techniques that were tested were not overwhelmingly
effective in reducing the detection rates across the four test groups. The tests in chapters
5 - 7 demonstrated that while it is possible to gain high levels of antivirus evasion, these
high levels of evasion are very selective. The levels of evasion depend on a number of
factors present in the original binary that was submitted for testing. The factors in the
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binaries that contributed to a more consistent reduction were larger, more complex and
had a high baseline detection rate. This is in comparison to the smaller and simpler
control binaries which had a lower starting detection rate and was not able to achieve a
consistent reduction in detection rates.
From the tests in chapter 7 it was possible to determine that a number of antivirus
engines do react to simple signatures in a binary by simply alternating the evasion
technique that was first applied and then evaluating the results. In cases where it was
possible to apply both evasion techniques to a binary, higher evasion rates were observed.
The intended goal for Chapters 5, 6 and 7 was to gain increasing evasion rates in each
chapter, which would match the complexity of the evasion techniques applied to the test
protocols. This began In Chapter 5, where a goal of 10 percentage point reduction was
set to be achieved. After reviewing the results, it is observed that this goal was achieved
with an average reduction of 36 percentage points. The intended goal for Chapter 6 was
to achieve an evasion rate of 10 percentage points or greater, which is the same as the
goals for the packers, this was achieved with a reduction of 29 percentage points across
the binaries tested.
The goals for Chapter 7 were two-fold. The first goal evaluated the effectiveness of
the evasion achieved by the “packer first” combination to determine if a higher evasion
rate could be achieved compared to the original tests. Following the same method of
testing, the second set of tests evaluated the effectiveness of the evasion achieved by the
“encrypt first” combination. The first goal was achieved: the average reduction in evasion
rates was 37 percentage points which is greater than the original results of 36 percentage
points. The second goal was successfully achieved as well: it averaged a 40 percentage
point reduction in detection rates which is greater than the original average reduction of
29 percentage points. It stands that the goals set out were achieved for this chapter. The
first section barely achieved the reduction goal with only 1 percentage point greater than
the goal, while the second section managed to achieve a better result with an average
reduction of 11 percentage points.
8.4 Future Work
There are currently a number of areas that can be expounded upon to take this work
forward. The first of these areas is to perform further analysis on the exact costing in
terms of time and resources when using an oﬄine laboratory. Once this is completed, the
process of automating the laboratory setup with the use of applications such as Docker or
Vagrant should be explored. If implemented correctly, this can reduce the testing time for
future research completed in this area. Further investigation also needs to be completed in
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the areas of the more advanced evasion techniques. This will most likely require acquiring
the source code to an existing trojan or virus and modifying it in such a way as to follow
the idea behind one of the dynamic evasion methods such as polymorphism.
8.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the work performed here explored the area of testing whether an evasion
technique could bypass an antivirus engine. This work further developed the approach
of online testing in which VirusTotal was evaluated as an online testing platform. This
testing demonstrated that it is possible to gain a reduction in the detection rates of
antivirus engines. It is noted that it was not possible to gain a perfect 100% evasion for
all binaries with any of the techniques tested. The work also illustrated that packers have
a good chance at producing a binary that can evade antivirus when compared to the same
ability in encryptors.
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Glossary
PUP Potentially unwanted application. These applications that are not inherently malicious
and their uses depend on the person using the application.. 6
trojan A type of non-viral malicious application that takes its name from Greek mythology.
Commonly used to deliver other malicious applications. 6
virus A virus is usually characterised by a small application that is designed to spread
by injecting malicious code into other binaries. 7, 97
worm A self-propagating program that attempts to spread by exploiting vulnerabilities
in a computer system. 8
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The following tables refer to the more verbose descriptions and various results of tests
that are included in the paper. They are ordered in the order they occur in the paper for
easier reference.
Table 1: Metasploit UPX OP Scan Results
Antivirus Engine Version Detected As
Antivirus Version Malware Signature
MicroWorld-eScan 12.0.250.0 Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722
CAT-QuickHeal 12.00 Trojan.Swrort
McAfee 6.0.4.564 RDN/Generic.dx!c2s
K7Antivirus 9.176.11663 Riskware ( 0040f0f51 )
K7GW 9.176.11663 Riskware ( 0040f0f51 )
TheHacker Posible Worm32
NANO-Antivirus 0.28.0.58873 Trojan.Win32.Inject1.cugnjk
TrendMicro-HouseCall 9.700-1001 TROJ GEN.F0C2C00A314
Kaspersky 12.0.0.1225 HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
BitDefender 7.2 Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722
Ad-Aware 12.0.163.0 Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722
Emsisoft 3.0.0.596 Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722 (B)
Comodo 18058 UnclassifiedMalware
F-Secure 11.0.19100.45 Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722
DrWeb 7.00.8.02260 Trojan.Inject1.33413
VIPRE 28078 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT
AntiVir 7.11.141.154 TR/Swrort.A.9181
TrendMicro 9.740-1012 TROJ GEN.F0C2C00A314
McAfee-GW-Edition 2013 RDN/Generic.dx!c2s
Sophos 4.98.0 Mal/Generic-S
Antiy-AVL 0.1.0.1 Trojan[:HEUR]/Win32.AGeneric
Kingsoft 2013.04.09.267 Win32.Troj.Undef.(kcloud)
Microsoft 1.10401 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A
GData 24 Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722
Panda 10.0.3.5 Generic Malware
Rising 25.0.0.11 PE:HackTool.Swrort!1.6477
Ikarus T3.1.5.6.0 Trojan.Win32.Swrort
Fortinet 4 Malware fam.NB
Baidu-International 3.5.1.41473 Trojan.Win32.Swrort.A
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Table 2: Malicious Binaries Packed with ASPack
Binary Name Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection Ratio
Malicious Binary 1 615863572d46. . . 16/55
Malicious Binary 2 6e2c9ecad006. . . 18/55
Malicious Binary 3 7f4cf838c55b. . . 19/55
Table 3: Malicious Binaries Packed with PECompact
Binary Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection Ration
Malicious Binary 1 16a5d346d22c. . . 18/55
Malicious Binary 2 ad2fcbda013c. . . 18/55
Malicious Binary 3 d235fb45b4d8. . . 19/55
Table 4: Malicious Binaries Packed with Custom Packer
Binary Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection Ration
Malicious Binary 1 a7db409d5bfe. . . 13/55
Malicious Binary 2 e12c09d7cc3d. . . 14/55
Malicious Binary 3 60982b7de65b. . . 18/55
Table 5: Malicious Binaries Packed with PEScrambler
Binary Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection Ratio Percentage Point Decrease
Malicious Binary 1 4f3aa42ddd71. . . 8/55 73 pp
Malicious Binary 2 58659313b855. . . 21/55 56 pp
Malicious Binary 3 b5a91d0508b3. . . 9/55 78 pp
Table 6: Baseline Scan with UPX
Shortened SHA256 Hash f7bdb777d1ed. . .
File name cmdupx.exe
Detection ratio 2/55
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Table 7: Baseline Scan with UPX Details
Antivirus Result
Bkav HW32.Paked.B0EF
TheHacker Posible Worm32
Table 8: Baseline Scan with ASPack
Shortened SHA256 Hash d650f9937c35. . .
File name cmdasp.exe
Detection ratio 2/55
Table 9: Baseline Scan with UPX Details
Antivirus Result
CMC Hoax.Win32.BadJoke.ScreenFlicker!O
Norman Suspicious.C6!genr
Table 10: Baseline Scan with PECompact
Shortened SHA256 Hash 793d8edfeddb. . .
File name cmdpe.exe
Detection ratio 9/55
Table 11: Baseline Scan with UPX Details
Antivirus Detected As
Agnitum Packed/PECompact
Bkav HW32.Paked.ABF3
Cyren W32/SysVenFak.B.gen!Eldorado
F-Prot W32/SysVenFak.B.gen!Eldorado
K7AntiVirus Trojan ( 00361abb1 )
K7GW Trojan ( 00361abb1 )
McAfee-GW-Edition BehavesLike.Win32.Rungbu.cc
Norman Suspicious.C4!genr
Qihoo-360 Malware.QVM17.Gen
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Table 12: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with UPX and Hyperion
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection Rate Percentage Point Change
280bdb09196c. . . 26/55
c7f050d01718. . . 24/55
7c0f676b2100. . . 22/55
968e6ae557a6. . . 23/55
Table 13: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with UPX and PEScrambler
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection Rate
8651c82dd82b. . . 10/55
d1a4ce55b39b. . . 37/55
af3cd521b0ba. . . 29/55
b7d205023174. . . 28/55
b5a91d0508b3. . . 9/55
Table 14: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with ASPack and Hyperion
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
9bae621660b9. . . 24/55
7a5fdbf978c9. . . 24/55
17cc27e38cd1. . . 22/55
da4e062d2627. . . 26/55
Table 15: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with ASPack and PEScrambler
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
7be35e2d8d52. . . 7/55
59275c39364b. . . 13/55
5bb572d9a688. . . 21/55
c97b878c1c57. . . 18/55
dcd8806f281c. . . 7/55
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Table 16: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with PECompact and Hyperion
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
c46e07ed1798. . . 26/55
2733768faf9a. . . 26/55
f7451086ec6a. . . 25/55
e9b626e7400c. . . 25/55
Table 17: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with PECompact and PEScrambler
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
fc125bea5928. . . 7/55
77f260470677. . . 3/55
2fbe0f4e1e4c. . . 14/55
87be1e70a35e. . . 8/55
Table 18: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with Hyperion and PEScrambler
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
9b6f3e81a7e6585c. . . 16/55
a2e41c4a6b48f6f1. . . 15/55
67adcf0567b2afef. . . 13/55
05c531a174064701. . . 12/55
Table 19: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with Hyperion and PECompact
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
e0b60f4e018a3dfb. . . 11/55
8f793aff79e0c06d. . . 16/55
67c2bc5926503461. . . 9/55
3490bb948eb819d8. . . 8/55
Table 20: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with Hyperion and UPX
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
136c5d6480b5afaa. . . 19/55
64fd4ba460d6c199. . . 19/55
ee83e519a090c6aa. . . 14/55
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Table 21: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with PEScrambler and ASPack
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
ca952fb80b7e7d46. . . 9/55
68486315fed5b227. . . 7/55
defb7d5a839dda74. . . 12/55
d83cd65920b252cb. . . 10/55
f8d81ee3ef0edc85. . . 0/55
Table 22: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with PEScrambler and PECompact
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
f8684340d11a. . . 11/55
60e3f4287ff4. . . 8/55
c45bdfa113c0. . . 5/55
38173616b668. . . 14/55
Table 23: Results From Dual Scanning Test Binaries with PEScrambler and UPX
Shortened SHA256 Hash Detection ratio
165e7775fd36. . . 15/55
424cf0a68727. . . 10/55
0c19dd1e9fd2. . . 11/55
65e4e92e099d. . . 21/55
Table 24: Custom Built Template Scan
Shortened SHA256 Hash 8eac4e5b577c. . .
File name template gcc upx.exe
Detection ratio 10 / 55
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Table 25: Basic Metasploit Template Scan
anti-virus Result Update
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722 20131208
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722 20131208
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722 (B) 20131208
GData Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722 20131208
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Graftor.113722 20131208
TheHacker Posible Worm32 20131204
TrendMicro PAK Generic.001 20131208
TrendMicro-HouseCall PAK Generic.001 20131208
Table 26: UPX OP Code Execution Scan Results
Shortened SHA256 Hash d1a4ce55b39b. . .
File name template gcc op upx.exe
Detection ratio 37 / 55
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